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Introduction
In the modern era, the problem of refugees and displaced persons is one that simply will
not go away. Whether it be people fleeing oppressive regimes, escaping from wars, or simply
seeking a better life, it remains a problem for which the global community has no ready answer
for. The problem of refugees, what to do with them and who, ultimately, is responsible for caring
for them, is not a new one. The world has been trying to address the general question for
generations and the question of how refugees should be handled by the international system since
the early twentieth century. Indeed, these early dealings with refugees serve as the bedrock of
many of the refugee systems that exist today.
Despite its importance, one of the most influential periods of refugee policy formation,
the years from roughly 1938 to 1946, has received little direct scholarly attention. In her 2008
study of the place of the refugee in international society, Emma Haddad claims that there have
been three main phases in handling refugees during the twentieth century: the inter-war period,
the Cold War, and the post-Cold War. 1 One will notice quite quickly that the war period is
missing from Haddad’s division. This, in and of itself, is not surprising. The periods that she
does include are dynamic, involving the rapid movement of large numbers of people, as well as
the large reactions from the global community, with laws passed and United Nations committees
made to address the plight of refugee groups.
In comparison, the period in and around World War II is disappointing and shameful, as
nations and international bodies failed to rescue the countless thousands of political, religious,
and ethnic refugees that would be victimized by the Nazis. Oftentimes, this failure occurred
either through a conscious choice or poor planning from the Western nations. However, if one
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chooses to view the development of refugee systems during this period as one of transition and
innovation, as historian Tommie Sjöberg suggests, rather than a period of failure, its importance
to the history of refugee systems increases substantially. 2
Transition and innovation describe this period well. The first international entity to truly
begin developing a global system for refugees was the League of Nations, which began its
involvement to provide an answer to the emergent Russian refugee crisis following the close of
World War I. This resulted in the creation of the League of Nations High Commissioner for
Russian Refugees, though the mandate of the High Commissioner would eventually grow to
include Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans, among others. The League’s system, by the late
1930s, proved itself to be incapable of answering the refugee question alone, especially as the
racial laws of the Nazis forced more and more political refugees and Jews to flock to the nations
around Germany. In response, the United States led many Western nations in the creation of the
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR) in 1938, a body which was supposed to be
responsible for the orderly emigration of those who were being forced from Germany to nations
of final settlement.
The League was not completely excised from the refugee system due to its lackluster
performance, nor was it supplanted by the IGCR. Rather, it continued to work alongside the
IGCR, and its High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Emerson, later served as Director of the IGCR in
addition to his League responsibilities. The outbreak of war in 1939 put an end to any thoughts
of a quick resolution to the refugee problem, and the IGCR and High Commission, unable to
truly intervene on behalf of refugees once the nations they represented turned their minds to war,
had to begin considering post-war refugee problems. These considerations often involved things
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that the League had been discussing, and in some cases putting into practice, since the 1920s,
like the legal rights of refugees and the issuing of a document for identification to those who
were made stateless. Thus, the prior actions of the League provided a fertile ground for further
development for those in the international refugee system during the war.
As mentioned, however, the IGCR and High Commission were simply not up to the task
of saving all of those who needed rescuing over the course of the war, due to their own structural
deficiencies, the lack of assistance they received from the governments they represented and, of
course, the fact that the world was in the midst of a global conflict. This failure did not mean that
these two bodies were discarded as soon as the Allied powers began to create a new international
system following the defeat of the Axis in 1945. True, both would essentially be absorbed by the
various United Nations organizations that followed them, but the expertise and knowledge
represented in these two bodies was used to help develop a new and more effective system. This
is most notable in the case of Emerson’s appearances before the U.N.’s Social and Economic
Council where he detailed the best way to construct a new refugee organization. Many of his
suggestions were incorporated into the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the body
which ultimately succeeded the IGCR and High Commission.
One can see, then, that the evolution of the international refugee system during World
War II warrants historical analysis. Even lessons learned due to the failure of the IGCR and High
Commission, like the lack of public funds being spent to support refugees, were incorporated
into those bodies which succeeded them. This historical analysis requires three things: an
investigation into the influence and impact of the League of Nations, of those intimately
involved with the refugee system during the war, most notably Emerson, and of the actions and
methods of the IGCR itself.

5
The inclusion of the League into the historiography of the international refugee system is
important, but has been neglected, as the League has been given little attention by modern
historians overall. Mostly, the League has either been dismissed as a failure in total, or its actions
on behalf of refugees have been broken down into single episodes. Examples of this episodic
treatment are best represented by Greg Burgess’s The League of Nations and the Refugees from
Nazi Germany: James G. McDonald and Hitler’s Victims and Martyn Housden’s two articles on
the Russian refugee crisis of the 1920s.3 Both authors make mention of the League’s legacy
concerning refugees, but focus mostly on the single instance before them, though Housden is less
guilty of this than Burgess. While further research into the League is needed, no matter the
scope, the connection of it to the modern international system has been sorely overlooked, aside
from the generic coverage of how the U.N. has learned from the League’s mistakes.
This new way of looking into the League is best described by the historians Patricia
Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels in their article “Transnationalism and the League of Nations:
Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial Organization.” 4 Clavin and Wessels
argue that historians must begin to move past the simple question of whether or not the League
was, or could ever have been, successful at handling those issues placed before it, like the
prevention of war.5 Rather, they contend a greater focus should be placed on understanding how
the organizations and bodies made by the League worked or its development of an international
pool of specialists, as these types of studies would provide a better understanding of the League’s
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impact on the modern era.6 This focus on the League’s continuity into the modern international
system, rather than a singular obsession on its failure falls in line with filling a gap in League
historiography described in an article by historian Nigel White, who asserts that much more of
the League system was brought into the modern day than many believe. 7
An examination of the individuals involved with the international refugee system ties in
with showing the influence of the League as well. As Clavin and Wessels argue, a goal of the
League was to create a pool of specialists on a variety of issues from which the global
community could draw from to assist with various crises. Sir Herbert Emerson, the previously
mentioned head of both the IGCR and the League’s High Commission, fits this description, as he
provided expertise and administrative guidance to the refugee system of the Allies during the
war, and helped to inform the creators of the IRO on the best ways to ensure its effectiveness.
There is little research on Emerson in general, and he is oftentimes relegated to be a character of
passing mention. There remains, then, a need for a historical spotlight to be shone on Emerson to
reveal his impact on the development of the refugee system during World War II, as well as his
successes and failures in leading those groups.
The IGCR itself is a body that has been given little notice in the general historiography of
international refugee systems and the Allied handling of refugees during the war in general. At
times, it is simply used as a means to bludgeon the Western powers with, a tangible example of
their failure. More frequently, it is reduced to a background figure. In his examination of the
modern refugee system, Phil Orchard gives passing mention to the IGCR, spending what little
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time he gives it on its weaknesses as a body. 8 Timothy Maga does not even mention the body in
his analysis of Franco-American actions on behalf of refugees in the 1930s, despite the fact that
he discusses the Evian Conference, the very meeting which created the IGCR. 9 Historians by no
means need to treat the IGCR with saccharine kindness, but it being treated as little more than a
footnote in the history of refugee systems is too reductive.
That is not to say that there are no historians who address the IGCR. There are four works
overall which address it with detail: David S. Wyman’s The Abandonment of the Jews: America
and the Holocaust, 1941-1945, Henry Feingold’s The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt
Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945¸ Tommie Sjöberg’s The Powers and the
Persecuted: the Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, 19381947, and Malcolm Proudfoot’s European Refugees, 1939-52: A Study in Forced Population
Movement. As can be seen from the title, the period that Wyman covers in his work narrowly
misses the beginning years of the IGCR’s operation. Rather, the IGCR serves as one character in
the larger story of the treatment of Jewish refugees by the United States during the war. Overall,
Wyman spends little time examining the body as a whole, focusing mostly on its failure, and
how that failure was reflective of the rather lax attitude most in the American government took
towards the plight of the Jews.10 Wyman concludes that the success of the IGCR, rather than
being in the further development of refugee policy, can only be found in its service as a
smokescreen for Allied governments when asked about their treatment of Jews. 11
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Emerson serves as a character in Wyman’s work as well, though he is given even less
attention than the body he led. Wyman focuses on Emerson’s tendency to stress the future of the
refugee system and not on the immediate relief of refugees, often implying that Emerson was not
as proactive as he should have been. 12 As with the IGCR, Wyman spends little time addressing
why Emerson had this tendency, nor does he address the overall influence he had on the post-war
refugee systems, though, this is likely because these fall outside the scope of his study.
Feingold is similar to Wyman. Overall, his goal was to examine and explain the response
of the Roosevelt administration to the Holocaust. 13 Moving past the reductive end goal of just
saying that Roosevelt failed the victims of the Nazis, Feingold tries to find out why Roosevelt
responded as he did. He does this by analyzing the refugee crisis from 1938 to early 1945,
putting a heavy emphasis on the workings of Roosevelt’s State Department and the reasoning
behind the policies of states towards refugees. This focus falls in line with a conclusion that
Feingold offers, saying that the failure of the Roosevelt administration to help refugees as much
as they could have was not the fault of any single individual, or the whole State Department, but
due to the very nature of a nation state. 14 Feingold serves as an important source to understand
the political reasoning the coincided policy decisions, and the Intergovernmental Committee is
an important character to this, appearing much more frequently in Feingold’s work than
Wyman’s.15
However, while Feingold is less hostile to many of the historical actors he interacts with
in comparison to Wyman, and the IGCR is closer to the center of his focus, his coverage of it is
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still lacking. As stated above, Feingold is concerned with explaining the politics that backed
government policy, which means that the actions of the IGCR are rarely looked at from the point
of view of that body. What was happening in the halls of Roosevelt’s Washington, as well as the
British Foreign Office, takes the driver’s seat, while the IGCR is relegated to being little more
than a passenger. The IGCR’s influence on later refugee systems is mentioned only once by
Feingold and remains untouched afterwards. 16 Feingold’s handling of Emerson is also
unsatisfactory. While he was not a member of Roosevelt’s administration, he served a very
important role in relation to it, and his influence on the system that was made after the war is
tangible. Feingold, however, treats him one dimensionally, allowing an offhand remark by
Emerson that was negative towards Jews as an excuse to paint him as a man who was not really
interested in the plight of refugees, and discussion of his influence on the IRO is nonexistent. 17
Similarly, Feingold’s coverage of the League system before and during the war, as well as its
influence on the system that was made by Roosevelt and his administration, is small in the
former’s case, and none at all in the latter’s. 18
Sjöberg’s work is a more comprehensive handling of the IGCR and refugee concerns
during World War II, and he even makes reference to the deficiencies found in both Feingold
and Wyman.19 He takes a more systematic approach to analyzing the political, strategic, and
economic factors of refugee policy during the period, traces the discrepancy between official
humanitarian rhetoric and the actual refugee policy of Allied governments, and assesses how the
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10
IGCR contributed to the overall development of refugee work. 20 Sjöberg excels at accomplishing
his first two goals. He covers in great detail the various political and social factors which led to
the United States getting involved in the refugee crisis in late 1930 and also the factors that
hampered it from devising actual solutions.21 He frequently provides the reader with examples of
the two leading powers of the IGCR, the United States and Great Britain, choosing not to enact
plans placed before them by officers of the IGCR or the global community as a whole that could
have actually helped refugees. 22
It is on his third point that Sjöberg stumbles. He spends so much time seeking to address
the question of why the IGCR was created that he neglects the question of what it did, aside from
cursory discussions of its failure, like Wyman. 23 He describes its importance by recognizing it as
the first intergovernmental refugee body made outside of the League’s umbrella, but it can
sometimes feel as if he stops there. 24 He often neglects satisfactory coverage of some of the
important figures of the IGCR, like Emerson, and, despite the fact that there is an entire chapter
dedicated to it, the League’s influence on the refugee systems after the war is a hard thread to
locate. Overall, Sjöberg’s efforts result in a work that is instrumental in placing the IGCR in its
cultural and political context but lacks satisfactory coverage of the actions of the body itself and
the influence of Emerson and the League fade to the background.
Proudfoot’s work is the least dynamic since it tends to avoid much historical
interpretation and seeks to provide a faithful recounting of the refugee situation in Europe during
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the war years; however, it is one of the most insightful. Proudfoot was someone who had worked
as a part of the refugee systems, and his work serves as a primer for how refugee problems were
handled, in the hope that future generations would learn from past lessons. 25 As such,
Proudfoot’s work is broad in its coverage, discussing the League, the IGCR, and several wartime
refugee bodies, like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the War
Refugee Board. This, of course, filled a gap in scholarship that existed in the 1950s, when the
work was written, and no work has truly been created in recent times that matches the ground
covered by Proudfoot. Still, more detailed studies are needed in some cases. Regardless, more so
than Wyman, Feingold or Sjöberg, Proudfoot helps to incorporate individuals outside of the
larger characters of President Franklin D. Roosevelt or Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the
influence of those like Emerson are able to shine through more, possibly because Proudfoot was
able to interview Emerson about his experience with refugee efforts. 26
There exist, then, three major gaps in the historiography of the international refugee
system that existed during World War II: the influence of the League, focused research into the
IGCR itself and its actions, and the analysis of some of the major individuals involved, like
Emerson. This thesis seeks to fill these gaps by detailing the early beginnings of international
assistance under the League of Nations, the development of the system that existed during the
war, and the influence of these two things on the system that was created in the post-war world.
The critical eye of Wyman and Sjöberg will not be abandoned, but some of the more
unreasonable critiques of the IGCR will be tempered and replaced by the questions of what was
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done, why it was done, and who did it. Failure to save lives should not be excused, but it is the
job of the historian to try and understand why this failure occurred, and what influence it has on
the modern day. This was a period of transition and development, as Sjöberg notes, from the
League system to the war system, and finally to the system as it exists in its modern form, and it
is time for these historical threads to be brought together once more.
This thesis is divided into four chapters, each dealing with a relatively short period of
time. The first chapter will cover the beginnings of the League’s involvement on behalf of
refugees in the early 1920s until the creation of the IGCR at the Evian Conference in 1938. This
gives the background of the actions taken by the League and provides a reader with an
understanding of what international refugee assistance looked like in its earliest form. It will also
detail the mounting inadequacies of the League system, which resulted in the United States
seeking to bolster it with the IGCR and Emerson’s assuming the position of High Commissioner
for Refugees.
Chapter two will detail the early years of the IGCR from 1938 to roughly the end of
1942. This includes the early actions of the IGCR, most notably its attempts to negotiate directly
on behalf of Jewish emigres with the German government. This period also includes the
placement of Emerson as the Director of the IGCR, the deepening relationship between the High
Commission and its non-League counterpart, and the abrupt halt to IGCR activities due to the
onset of the war.
Chapter three covers 1943 to the end of 1944. This was a period of restructuring and
reorganization, as the IGCR was resuscitated with a new mandate that gave it more responsibility
in response to a growing public awareness of the horrors being visited on Nazi victims. This
chapter also explains the rise of several new refugee bodies which would work alongside the
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IGCR in the form of UNRRA and the War Refugee Board, and the lengthy process to define
jurisdictions and avoid wasteful overlap. This period was one of preparation for the post-war
problems, full of conjecture and planning that, considering the fact that thousands were dying
every day at the hands of the Nazis, can often seem callous.
Finally, the fourth chapter examines the period from 1945 to the beginning of the IRO’s
actual operation in 1947. The chapter will highlight the slow realization of those involved in all
levels of the refugee system that the structures that had been made before and during the war
were insufficient for the problems that manifested in peacetime. This insufficiency, however, did
not mean that the experience of these bodies was tossed aside, but rather was utilized to make a
more robust and adaptive system. Emerson’s expertise, though rarely commented on by other
historians, was sought out by the U.N. in this matter. The goal of these chapters and this thesis is
to fill a gap in the historiography of international refugee systems, which dismisses the influence
of the League, avoids the topic of the IGCR, and rarely mentions Emerson. This thesis will give
them the focus that many historians have withheld and, while their history is filled with
disappointment and failure, will show that their influence on the development of international
refugee policy is tangible.
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Chapter 1: Pity and Reason Alike
In April of 1946, Sir Herbert Emerson sat before the Social and Economic Council of the
United Nations and gave his thoughts on how the U.N.’s future organization to care for refugees
from World War II should be organized. Emerson represented the culmination of nearly 25 years
of experience in international minority and refugee protection and either ran, or helped to run,
many of the refugee organizations which existed during World War II. He was also the last of the
League of Nations’ High Commissioners for Refugees, an office first created in the aftermath of
World War I and resurrected just before the outbreak of World War II.
For those with only passing knowledge of the League of Nations it is, perhaps, surprising
to hear that it was so intimately involved with the development and maintenance of refugee
systems both before and during World War II. However, the League had a long and storied
history of working with refugees which included not just guaranteeing physical relief, but also
legal protection and the provision of legal documents like passports. This involvement with
refugee care helped lay the groundwork for the organizations, like the Intergovernmental
Committee for Refugees and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which
tried to aid the victims of Nazism after Hitler’s rise to power and through the end of the war.
The beginning of the League’s history of caring for refugees came following World War
I. The League of Nations was created from the Treaty of Versailles and was tasked with being a
body where the powers of the world could use diplomacy to settle their problems, rather than
turning to the battlefield.27 However, the world was not in a position to allow the new body
dedicated to peace and order to simply handle just the philosophical issues of peace, as the Great
War had left much of it in shambles. This was most obvious in the East, where Russia had
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recently been turned into the first communist nation, and Asia Minor, a hotbed of minority strife
in the best of times, was staggering following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 28
In February 1920, the Supreme Council of Allied Nations requested the League appoint
someone to coordinate the repatriation of the 250,000 prisoners of war in Russia, working in
close concert with various voluntary organizations, like the International Red Cross (IRC), and
the governments of other nations.29 To this end, the League appointed Dr. Fridtjof Nansen,
famed Norwegian Arctic explorer and diplomat, as its agent to help straighten out the situation of
repatriating prisoners of war in April 1920. 30 Thus, by the request of the victorious powers of
Europe, the League began its first foray into helping those effected by the political situation
following the war, though this did not at first mean refugees.
Nansen proved to be adept at the task assigned to him, and he began to work closely with
the governments involved with prisoner transport and various voluntary organizations. Nansen
was to be, essentially, a League empowered coordinator, and he focused on meeting with
governments involved, like Finland or Poland, to develop new sea routes for transport and
constantly pushed the League to use its own machinery to aid the situation. 31 By the end of 1920,
Nansen had repatriated some 100,000 prisoners of war, and he had so impressed the League that
his responsibilities were extended to prisoners of war in Bulgaria and Greece. 32
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However, the problems of the East did not limit themselves just to the large numbers of
prisoners of war following World War I. In mid-1921, following years of upheaval caused by
civil war and the rise of the Bolsheviks, nearly 1.5 million Russian refugees scattered about
Europe and Asia, from Poland to Egypt.33 Initially, these refugee populations had been cared for
by the various voluntary organizations of the world, like the IRC and the American Joint Jewish
Distribution Committee. However, it quickly became apparent to them that merely providing
material aid for refugees would not bring the building crisis to a close. To this end, the IRC
wrote to the League’s Council on June 15, 1921, following a previous discussion in February,
requesting its help.34
The IRC believed that a more uniform process of delivering material aid to refugees
needed to be put in place, encouraged the development of education and employment
opportunities in countries of refuge, and worked to secure the legal protections for refugees. 35
While the IRC had created a mixed commission with other voluntary bodies to handle material
aid, it determined that the League of Nations was the only organization that existed to deal with
the other two problems.36 As such, the IRC requested that the League appoint a High
Commissioner to lead a League-backed organization for refugees. 37 Thus, the first insinuation
that the League should take charge of refugee affairs came from voluntary organizations, not the
League itself.
The League’s Council was initially wary of the IRC’s request. The representatives of the
Council worried that the League had neither the mandate nor the funds to care for refugees and
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that the various governments involved would rather handle the matter themselves. 38 Despite
these reservations, the Council decided to hold a conference of concerned member states to
discuss the Russian refugee crisis and the League’s possible involvement with it on June 27,
1921.39
The conference was nothing less than a total refutation of the Council’s fears. The
various governments in attendance wholeheartedly agreed that the League should be intimately
involved in solving the refugee question and backed the IRC’s request for a High Commissioner
to be appointed.40 The conference did not decide how deeply the League and its possible High
Commissioner would be involved in helping refugees, or what routes of aid it should take.
Obviously, it could not just shoulder the entire financial burden. This spurred the Council to
release a questionnaire to the members of the League, asking them whether the League should
get involved with Russian refugees, how that involvement would look, and for any other
suggestions they could make about how to proceed. 41 Resoundingly, the responding governments
answered that the League should be intimately involved with the refugee question.
Some governments provided more helpful information and suggestions. France urged the
League to select Nansen since he was currently successfully running the League’s efforts to
repatriate prisoners of war and had worked with many of the governments involved in the
situation, including the Russian government. 42 Many other governments mirrored France’s
support of Nansen. Czechoslovakia’s response, written by the future Czech representative to the
League Eduard Benes, recommended that any League organization get involved with the rights
38
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of refugees and the possible creation of a passport for refugees who either did not have one, or
had been denaturalized.43
The Council voted to create the office of the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees
on June 27, 1921 and specified its responsibilities would be to define the legal status of refugees,
to organize repatriation or transference efforts, to find employment for refugees, and to
coordinate relief with philanthropic institutions.44 A second conference was held on August 24,
1921 to further highlight the High Commissioner’s responsibilities for legal protections and
passports, and recognizing that, since many refugees would not want to return to Russia,
securing occupations in countries of refuge would be a high priority. 45 The second outcome of
the August conference was the nomination of Nansen to the office of High Commissioner, a
nomination that he accepted on September 1. 46
The crisis Nansen inherited was complex and widespread. To begin with, refugees were
scattered, with several thousand around Constantinople, another several thousand in Egypt and
the Greek islands, some 250,000 in France, and many thousands in Eastern Europe. To
compound this difficulty, some of these communities were on the brink of collapse, as was the
case of the starving refugees around Constantinople, who would be a point of focus for Nansen
throughout 1921-1922.47 To make matters worse, the Russian refugee crisis, as many called it,

43

Ibid., 492.
League of Nations, "The Question of the Russian Refugees: Report by M. Hanotaux, Adopted on June
27th," League of Nations Official Journal 2, no. 7 (September 1921): 757.
45
League of Nations, "Conference on the Question of the Russian Refugees: Resolutions Adopted by the
Conference on August 24th, 1921," League of Nations Official Journal 2, no. 8 (October 1921): 899-901.
46
League of Nations, "The Question of Russian Refugees: Information Provided by Members of the
Conference of Enquiry Held at Geneva, August 22nd-24th, 1921, and Memoranda Submitted to that Conference,"
League of Nations Official Journal 2, no. 9 (November 1921): 1015.
47
League of Nations, "Rationing of Russian Refugees at Constantinople: Correspondence Between the
High Commissioner for Russian Refugees and the French Government," League of Nations Official Journal 2, no.
10-12 (December 1921): 1247.
44

19
was not limited solely to Russians by the end of 1921, as reports from Turkey and the rise of
Mustafa Kemal foretold of a possible Armenian refugee crisis. 48
Over the course of the direst period of the Russian refugee crisis, Nansen and the
League’s work solidified into roughly two main categories: gaining material aid for refugees and
securing their legal protection. Aid for physical well-being came in many forms. The most
obvious was getting food and goods like medicine or blankets to refugees directly. Oftentimes,
Nansen simply coordinated with voluntary organizations to fulfill this task, something that would
become a common practice for High Commissioners after him; but he was not beyond using the
Commission’s own funds to secure foodstuffs when it was desperately needed. 49 He also made
use of other League bodies, like the Epidemic Commission, to supply refugees with vaccines. 50
Material aid came in slightly more abstract ways as well. A driving goal for both the new
League refugee organization and the many voluntary bodies that it worked alongside was to get
refugees to a point where they could support themselves without needing the charity of others.
Not only would this take a burden away from countries of refuge, but it would, hopefully, instill
a sense of dignity into refugees. However, in many cases, refugees found themselves in an area
of refuge that had a stagnate job market, like Constantinople.51 To begin to address this problem,
Nansen and his Commission partnered with the International Labor Office to take a job census of
refugees throughout Europe and Anatolia to determine their skills, so that nations of permanent
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settlement could be able to find refugees to suit their job market needs and facilitate
emigration.52
For this scheme to work, however, refugees would have to be able to be transported to
their new homes, and this revealed another dilemma. Many had neither passports nor means to
obtain visas and others had been denationalized by their country of origin. 53 Thus, the goal of the
High Commission to provide aid through finding work married with the need to provide refugees
with legal documents and international standing. Nansen and his Commission took ideas that had
first been floated at the August 1921 conference and began to develop a plan for refugee
passports. In the end, Nansen developed a template for the League’s various member states
which, at the High Commission’s request, would be issued to any refugee who requested one,
free of charge.54 If this plan was used, the League members would still hold the sovereign right
to issue passports, as they would not be issued in the League’s name, but the High Commission
could control who received them. Nansen, citing the difficulties experienced in Constantinople,
also requested that member states provide travel visas when the High Commission requested,
free of charge.55 These passport templates, later called Nansen passports, were approved by most
League member states in March 1922, and those states who did not use them promised to view
them as valid.56
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Nansen’s efforts did much to secure legal identification documents for refugees, provide
them material aid, and identify gainful employment, all of which helped improve the overall
refugee situation. Additionally, his work also helped to ingrain the League’s High Commission
for Refugees into the international system. Over the course of 1921-1922, he set up a series of
League Offices from Constantinople to Berlin to deal with the local handling of Commission
business as well as appointing representatives to have closer contact with governments involved
in the refugee crisis.57 The Commission so impressed the powers of the world that it was charged
with the handling of a population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1922 that involved
almost one million people.58 Nansen, himself, was invited to the Lausanne Conference of 19221923, which saw to the peaceful end of the Turkish War for Independence, to speak on the
refugee situation in the East and the possibilities of refugee transfer. 59
Over the course of the early 1920s, Fridtjof Nansen and the League of Nations worked to
create an international organization to address the growing postwar refugee crisis. This system,
originally created to simply repatriate prisoners of war, was later expanded to include more
groups of displaced people and was relied upon by the officials of the great powers to handle
something as great as a population exchange between two nations. The League’s Commission
provided direct aid to refugees, coordinated the actions of voluntary groups to minimize wasteful
overlap, transported refugees to more welcoming areas, sought out job opportunities and training
for them, and, perhaps most impressively, provided passports and certificates of identity to those
who had none, free of charge. These actions created the foundation for a system that would
57
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become a flagship responsibility for the League of Nations. Indeed, one could argue that the
actions of these historical actors proved to the global community that refugee crises could not be
handled by one state alone but were the concern of the international whole.
However, the work of the High Commission for Refugees did not end following the close
of the direst period of the Russian refugee crisis. Over the coming years, there would be many
efforts by the more internationally minded members of the League to widen the scope of its
concerns. This, of course, began in 1922, when Armenian refugees from Turkey were added to
Nansen’s responsibilities, but it was an ongoing process through much of the 1920s and 1930s.
In 1926, the League’s Assembly, the gathered body of all the various member states, voted to
extend the protections granted to Russian and Armenian refugees by the High Commission to
any refugee in similar conditions or similarly made stateless as a consequence of World War I. 60
By 1928, the International Labor Organization, as well as the Assembly, pushed for the rights
and protections extended to those under the High Commissioner to be given to several new
groups of refugees, mainly Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, Montenegrins, and Turks. 61 One can
see, then, that the League in the 1920s was committed to further the protections it had developed
for stateless people and refugees, slowly building the reach of the Commission.
At the turn of the decade, however, things began to change. In September 1930, the
League Assembly voted to create the Nansen International Refugee Office, which would take
over and discharge all of the functions of the High Commissioner for Refugees. 62 This came as a
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result of a number of things, mainly the death of Nansen in 1930, and the desire to place the
responsibilities of the High Commissioner in a body that answered to the League but was also its
own entity. The Nansen Office would be this entity. Set to begin operation on April 1, 1931 and
headed by Max Huber, the Office would be responsible for overseeing the welfare of refugees,
assisting in securing employment for them, giving general instructions to voluntary
organizations, and dispersing resources. 63 This included funds gained from the new system of
Nansen stamps, where people in member states of the League could purchase postage stamps
that would help to fund refugee work. 64 In addition, while the Nansen Office was technically
under the direction of the League, its officials were responsible for their own actions, and it was
distinct from the workings of the Secretariat. 65
In many ways, the Nansen Office seemed to just be a natural extension of the refugee
system, further cementing the work of Nansen into a body that could operate on its own, though
with the backing of the international community via the League. However, there was an
important distinction that set it apart from the office of the High Commissioner: the Nansen
Office had an end date. The position that Nansen held before his death originated as a response
to a major crisis, and many of the powers and responsibilities it developed came as a natural
outgrowth of working in the midst of that crisis. There was a belief amongst many League
representatives that the crisis had since past, and that the Nansen Office could bring about the
successful conclusion of the work started by its namesake in the 1920s. 66 To this end, the Nansen
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Office’s constitution specified that it would cease its operation no more than nine years after it
was established, meaning it would liquidate in 1939. 67
Despite the vocal expressions of the Nansen Office’s first president, Max Huber, that the
task before the new body was of an almost incomprehensible magnitude, the nine-year time limit
of operation does not seem too extreme. 68 Nansen had been slowly working through the process
of establishing internationally accepted rights and protections for refugees, had obtained legal
documents for them, and had either repatriated or reestablished an impressive number of
refugees by his death. If that process could be maintained, then it was not out of the question that
the refugee crisis that began in the 1920s could be, at the very least, mostly brought to a close by
1939. As historian Emma Haddad notes, this decision to place a time limit on the Nansen Office
reflected a common belief in the nation-state system that refugees were the exception to the
norm, meaning that a permanently standing refugee system would not be needed once refugees
from one crisis were assisted.69
This arrangement, however, would only work if the global refugee situation continued to
improve. Unfortunately, events soon conspired against the League. Beginning in 1932, the
League began to hear reports of growing antisemitism within Germany, and by 1933 it had
several cases before its Council concerning Jews who had lost their jobs as a result. 70 The major
case before the Council, that of Franz Bernheim, was not an isolated incident, and the countries
bordering Germany soon began to experience a growing number of Jewish and political
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emigrants.71 Considering the trajectory of new laws being passed under the Nazi party following
its ascension to power in March 1933, like the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil
Service, it seemed like that flow would not be stymied in a quick manner. 72 In addition to this
problem, there was the problem of Germany itself. Germany had a representative on the
League’s Council and was one of the bigger powers represented in the League in general,
overshadowed only by France and Britain. It could veto actions it disliked, like bringing the new
Jewish refugees under the care of the Nansen Office. To criticize Germany too harshly could
cause problems within the League, something most League supporters feared after Japan’s
announcement that it would leave the League following the Mukden Incident in 1932. 73 In
addition, the League had made it a rule to rarely, if ever, address the internal actions of a state’s
government, which included the Nazi’s antisemitic laws. 74
In an attempt to address both the need to help the Jewish refugees and placate Germany,
the League’s Assembly resolved on October 11, 1933 to create the office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) from Germany, headed by the American James
G. McDonald.75 This Commissioner would be responsible for negotiating and collaborating with
nations to try and secure work for German refugees, and, like the Nansen Office, he would be
responsible for coordinating funds from voluntary organizations. 76 As McDonald later put it, he
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was to negotiate and direct international coordination to “solve the economic, financial, and
social problem of the refugees.” 77
However, the League’s new Commission was separate from the Nansen Office. Unlike
the Nansen Office, it was a distinct entity, separate to the League, but technically answerable to
it, to avoid any veto attempt by Germany concerning its actions. 78 But, this meant it lacked the
established powers of the successor to Nansen’s organization. It also had a liquidation date in
1939. This meant it had neither the contacts of the Office, nor access to the funds gathered
through the Nansen stamp program, or the Humanitarian Fund, which was held in trust by the
Nansen Office. To make matters worse, soon after its establishment, Germany announced its
intention on October 19, 1933 to leave the League of Nations. 79 This was a blow not only to the
League as a whole, since it was the second power to leave the organization in less than a year,
but also a blow to the effectiveness of new High Commissioner. Since it was no longer a member
of the League, Germany did not have to interact with McDonald and could ignore any of his
requests to negotiate for the betterment of Jewish emigrants. He could, essentially, only do his
work with those who made their way out of Germany.
As the mid-1930s approached, the League found its refugee systems to be in operation, if
somewhat scattered. The Nansen Office handled the refugees left from the 1920s and oversaw
the maintenance of refugee protections, while the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and
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Other) from Germany had a more focused mandate, though it lacked many of the resources of its
sister organization. Events seemed to be conspiring against the League and its refugee
organizations, however. In 1935, McDonald stepped down from his position as High
Commissioner. Writing a lengthy resignation letter, McDonald described his frustration with
what he felt was a hamstrung organization, lacking both League and international support. 80 He
further explained the effect of many of the laws the Nazis had been passing, which resulted in
many Jews who emigrated being forced to do so while essentially being stateless and penniless. 81
As a result, McDonald called on both the League and the states of the world to get more involved
in the growing Jewish refugee crisis, which was becoming too much for private organizations
alone to handle.82 He argued that the constant deference to Germany to avoid insulting the Nazi
state had to stop and that, eventually, “pity and reason alike must inspire the hope that
intercession will meet with response.” 83 McDonald would be replaced by the British Major
General Sir Neill Malcolm, though his part in the organization of refugee aid was not yet over.
There was also the matter of the eventual termination of the League’s refugee bodies,
something which would affect both refugees from the 1920s and the growing number of Jewish
refugees from Germany. This concern was not lost on members of the League. A 1937 report by
Michael Hanson, Huber’s successor as the President of the Nansen Office, made the SecretaryGeneral of the League aware that, while the Office was on schedule to liquidate, he was
convinced there would still be a significant amount of remaining refugee work. 84 As the
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liquidation date for the League’s refugee obligations approached, the international body began to
take steps to address the concerns of many of its members. This started during the October 1937
meeting of the League’s Assembly. At this meeting, the League’s main body reaffirmed its
intention to have both the Nansen Office and the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and
Other) from Germany dissolve on December 31, 1938.85 That being said, the Assembly also
instructed the Council to appoint a committee made up of the representatives from Bolivia,
France, and the United Kingdom to consider a future plan for international assistance to
refugees.86
The Assembly’s effort culminated in a convention of seventeen nations, including the
United States, in February 1938 which sought to address the status of refugees from Germany, as
well as refugees in general. The conference itself covered a significant amount of ground and
seemed intent on laying down a standardized way of handling refugees once the League’s
systems lapsed. For example, one of the objectives was defining who a refugee from Germany
was, and the convention delegates defined it as anyone who had possessed German nationality
but no longer enjoyed the protection of the German government, or stateless people not covered
in a previous convention that were established in Germany, and no longer had the protection of
their government.87 There was also a heavy emphasis on how nations should treat refugees
within their borders. This included providing travel documents and visas to assist in transit for
little or no cost, protecting refugees from expulsion except for matters of national security,
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providing facilities and training for refugees, and defining what legal protections refugees should
have.88
The convention established some internationally accepted ground rules for how to treat
refugees once the Nansen Office and High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany ended.
The hope was that, so long as the situation remained the same, these measures would help it
reach an acceptable conclusion. While the League could not directly deal with Germany and the
steady leak of emigrants from its borders, it could at least try to equip the countries around it.
Indeed, while the forward march of Nazi laws had pushed a growing number of Jews from
Germany, the problem had, for the most part, been limited to the Jewish population of Germany,
and others the Nazis deemed to be undesirables. 89 This changed in March of 1938 when, in an
event that has come to be known as the Anschluss, Nazi Germany annexed Austria. Suddenly,
the numbers of those who fell under the Nazi racial laws grew, meaning that the number of those
who would attempt to flee them would grow as well. 90
This swell of refugees threw a wrench in the planned winding down of the League’s
efforts, since any emigrants from Austria did not fit within the accepted categories of their
mandates. It came to the point that the Council instructed the High Commissioner of Refugees
from Germany, Neill Malcolm, in May 1938 to assume the refugees from the former territory of
Austria fell under his purview.91 Malcolm was also instructed to observe the overall condition of
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this new group of refugees and to report his findings both to the Council and a few other states,
like Brazil and the United States, presumably to pique their interest in possibly accepting some
number of these refugees.92
Following the annexation of Austria, both the international community and the League
itself recognized that its current system was not sufficiently handling the growing Jewish refugee
crisis. There was the added pressure that even these ineffectual organizations would soon
disappear, leaving states and voluntary organizations on their own. However, the international
community and the League had two different responses, though they both belonged in the same
vein of attempts to centralize aid for refugees. Over the course of the summer of 1938, both the
League and many of the Western powers, headed by the United States, sought to create new
organizations more equipped to deal with the worsening situation.
On May 13, 1938, the investigative committee the League’s Council had commissioned
in January submitted its report for how the League could guarantee competent handling of the
ongoing refugee crisis. The committee recognized several facts about the overall situation. First,
they estimated the total numbers of refugees in question, some 600,000, and explained that the
favored method for taking care of them, emigration, would not be sufficient to solve the problem.
Rather, it asserted that the world would have to turn to absorption, or integrating refugee
populations within their countries of refuge. 93 The committee also recognized the Assembly’s
desire to end the Nansen Office and current position of High Commissioner for Refugees
Coming from Germany by the end of the year, though it noted that many member states
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considered refugee care within the League framework to be indispensable. 94 To this end, the
committee recommended the creation of the singular office of the High Commissioner of
Refugees to pick up the responsibilities of the two organizations that preceded it once they
dissolved.95
This proposed new High Commissioner would operate for a limited time as well, but
while it existed it would be very reminiscent of the office when Nansen himself had held it. The
High Commissioner would oversee the application of refugee protections the League had
created, coordinate the distribution of material aid, and would work directly with governments
and private organizations, even being able to establish representatives in other countries. 96
Interestingly, the report specifically mentioned that the new High Commissioner would assist
governments and private organizations with emigration and permanent settlement. 97 As
previously mentioned, emigration had become a common preference for handling refugee
populations, moving them from a place unable, or unwilling, to absorb added populations to
somewhere more accommodating. However, the rise of restrictive immigration policies had
made such measures difficult to implement.
Regardless of method, the League approved of the committee’s recommendations, and
spent the summer of 1938 refining the duties of the proposed new office of High Commissioner
of Refugees. By September 28, the Assembly ratified the new office and defined the scope of its
powers.98 The High Commissioner would take responsibility for those who had formerly been
under the care of the Nansen Office and Malcolm’s organization, as well as refugees fleeing
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from Austria.99 The High Commissioner was to be located in London, and he would provide for
the protection of refugees, coordinate humanitarian assistance, and work with governments and
private organizations.100 The High Commission could accept funds from governments and
private groups or people to fulfill its obligations, and it would gain access to any funds left from
the Nansen Office. It would be allowed to disperse these funds to the organizations best suited to
use them, but not to directly provide assistance itself. 101 Sir Herbert Emerson, a former British
governor in India, was selected to take on the role of the High Commissioner for Refugees. 102
While the League was creating this new position, others in the international community,
led by the United States, had been working on refugee care as well, and the result of their efforts
was the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR). 103 Beginning in roughly March
1938, officers of the U.S. State Department had begun to send out telegrams to the foreign
offices of various states about the creation of a new refugee committee. 104 This new committee
was the brainchild of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and its purpose was to be a coordinating
body, mainly for emigration, that would bolster, not interfere with, the refugee bodies that
already were in operation.105 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in his efforts to sell the proposed
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body to the world, clarified in a conversation with an ambassador from the Soviet Union that
Roosevelt’s new body would deal only with those suffering from persecution in Germany and
Austria, not all refugees.106 The League accepted the IGCR as, within the resolution for the
creation of the High Commissioner for Refugees, it specified that he would work closely with the
new organization.107
Emigration itself was a tricky subject to address in the late 1930s. Many large states like
the United States had curtailed its immigration numbers through the use of quotas, or annual
limits on the numbers of immigrants allowed from a certain area, since the 1920s. 108 The
growing tide of refugees from Germany stretched this isolationist tendency to its limit, as
refugees in countries of refuge found it hard to gain passage to a country of final settlement and
languished in their semi-permanent homes. Indeed, one of the traditional outlets for Jewish
emigration, Palestine, would essentially be cutoff following a British Royal Commission report
in late 1938 and had been purposely slowed since 1936. 109 The goal of the United States to create
a new refugee body in addition to those already in operation was to facilitate the emigration of
those being forced to leave Germany while working with nations of final settlement to respect
and navigate varying immigration laws.110 Uniquely, the proposed new body was to be able to
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consider long-term issues of the refugee problem, rather than just handling the immediate
symptoms of it, and be equipped to negotiate with Germany, something the League’s
organizations could not technically do.111
On July 6, 1938, in Evian, France, representatives from 32 countries, ranging from the
United States and Great Britain to the Latin American republics, met to discuss the creation of
Roosevelt’s proposed Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees. By the end of the conference,
on July 15, what Roosevelt and Hull had spent much of the spring and early summer trying to
sell to the world came into being, and the IGCR was born. The responsibilities and governing
principles of the new organization reflected many of the points found in U.S. State Department
telegrams to other nations. The purpose of the IGCR was to oversee orderly emigration and to
relieve overwhelmed nations of their burden of refugees. 112 The mandate of the IGCR extended
only to those left in Germany and Austria who still needed to emigrate due to political, religious,
or racial reasons, as well as those outside of Greater Germany who had yet to be established. 113
Of course, there was overlap with the League’s refugee efforts with this second category.
Interestingly, however, written into the constitution of the IGCR was the stipulation that the
members of the Committee would assume no obligation to finance involuntary emigration,
meaning that member governments were not expected to pay any money in their efforts and that
costs would be borne by private organizations.114
The development of an international system for caring for refugees was not a quick
process. Begun in the 1920s by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, a common theme for such a system was
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hammered out. Most of the global community decided that the best way to oversee the solving of
refugee crises was to place the power of coordination in the hands of an internationally
empowered individual, who would see that the needs of refugees were being met by voluntary
organizations or governments involved, in addition to defining the legal protection of refugees.
This individual became, following Nansen’s efforts with Russian and Armenian refugees, a facet
of the League of Nations, and much of the 1920s were spent increasing the number of those who
fell under the purview of the first High Commissioner for Refugees. One of the founding tenants
of this system, however, was that the crisis that had caused an outpouring of refugees was
temporary, and, once the refugees were cared for, things would return to normal. It was assumed,
therefore, that any refugee organizations need only be temporary as well, and the succeeding
organization of the first High Commission, the Nansen Office, would dissolve after only nine
years.
Ultimately, future events disproved the assumption of the global community, and, in the
face of increased numbers of refugees from Germany, the League was forced to make a new
refugee organization, the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) from Germany.
However, this organization had an expiration date as well and was so underequipped for the
growing problem that its first High Commissioner, James G. McDonald, was forced to retire in
frustration. The problems of Jewish refugees emigrating from Germany, willingly or not, did not
follow McDonald into retirement, and by 1938 things had reached a boiling point, leading to the
creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, a new refugee body developed
outside the League of Nations by the United States.
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Chapter 2: Palliatives and Cures
In response to a growing refugee crisis in the 1930s, the global community began to
develop new bodies for lessening the plight of refugees. The League of Nations, the authoritative
international body in regard to refugee assistance since the 1920s, created the office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees in 1938 and placed the British Sir Herbert Emerson in charge of its
refugee efforts. The League, however, was past its prime regarding its effectiveness as an
institution, as its poor handling of crises earlier in the decade, combined with the slow loss of
member states, hindered its ability to address the German refugee crisis by itself. To this end, the
United States began to push for the creation of a new refugee body tailored to handle the orderly
movement of refugees from Germany to states of final settlement, as well as some other longterm concerns. The result was the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees.
The efforts of the League’s High Commission and the IGCR from 1938-1942 were a
strange mix of innovation, idealism, pragmatism, and synthesis. Grand schemes for saving
thousands of refugees were entertained, the relationship of governments with the funding of
refugee aid was challenged, the distinction between the IGCR and the League’s Commission
became murky and plans of purely humanitarian concerns clashed with government officials
with more complex mindsets and motives. Regardless of anything the world’s two refugee
bodies did at the close of the 1930s, the outbreak of World War II effectively ground most efforts
to a halt and forced those in the international refugee system to reconsider their relationship to
the refugee question as a whole.
The IGCR had its first official meeting on August 3, 1938 in London and would spend
the rest of 1938 solidifying both its executive make up and how it would go about fulfilling its
goals. Unlike the League’s High Commission, which had a single executive head with a small
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number of officials under him, the IGCR was made up of two parts. The first were a set of
executive officers - a chairman, four vice-chairmen, and a director - that would see to the actual
execution of the IGCR’s goals, and the second was the collective body of the representatives of
the member nations.115 At the first meeting, Edward Turnour, hereafter Lord Winterton, a British
member of Parliament and Earl of Winterton, was elected as Chairman, while the American
lawyer George Rublee was selected as the Director.116 The purposes of the IGCR were simplified
to be twofold: to have the Director negotiate with Germany to make emigration for Jews easier
by permitting them to emigrate with more of their personal wealth and to have the Director work
with the primary states of final settlement, usually Latin American countries, to facilitate
emigration there.117 This heavy focus on final settlement became a feature of the early work of
the IGCR, so much so that it would even refuse membership to Czechoslovakia since it was felt
that states of temporary refuge, which the Czech state was, were not of the same level of import
as those of final settlement.118
As one might expect from an infant organization that burst onto the scene of an
incredibly complex international problem, the IGCR had a rather fitful start in its first few
months. Things started off relatively well, as on August 12, representatives from the Dominican
Republic sent a secret message to Winterton offering to take anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000
involuntary emigrants in a short amount of time and to provide them with facilities for a
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permanent settlement.119 This offer would only cover a part of the some 600,000 refugees that
the League of Nations estimated were currently in Europe, not to mention those still having to
leave Germany, but it was a promising start, even if the area of settlement would have to be
investigated and large-scale emigration funded before the Dominican Republic’s offer could be
accepted. Yet the IGCR was frustrated on other fronts, namely in making itself a fully accepted
member of the international refugee regime and in its attempt to negotiate directly with
Germany, the major thing that set it apart from the League’s efforts.
Throughout the remainder of 1938, there would be a constant tug-of-war between the
American elements of the IGCR and the British and French elements about the overall place of
their new Committee. The European powers feared that the IGCR’s efforts would interfere with
those of the League of Nations, and the British even went so far as to recommend the IGCR
become an advisory body for the League’s refugee organizations. 120 Hull felt strongly that the
IGCR and the League complimented one another, whereas Rublee felt that the U.S.’s ability to
push Latin American countries to accept emigrants made it indispensable. 121 The IGCR could
also address the major gap in the League’s care for refugees: its inability to deal with
Germany.122 In the American Secretary of State’s mind, the IGCR and its director would handle
Germany and those within that territory, while the League could focus on refugees that fell under
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the Nansen Office, arranging documentation for emigrants and doing long-term planning. 123
Interestingly, this is somewhat of a change from what was described at the Evian Conference,
where the IGCR was to have some part to play in planning long-term refugee care.
This effort to show how the League, as it worked through 1938 to develop what would
become the High Commission for Refugees, and the IGCR complimented one another also
highlighted their divergent roles. This meant that, despite Hull’s best efforts to dissuade member
nations that it was not the sole function of the Committee, increased importance began to be
placed on negotiation with Germany. 124 Germany, however, proved to be decidedly
noncommittal. Things had gotten so bad that by October 1938, Rublee wrote to Hull requesting
that he begin pushing for German officials to meet with him, saying “either the German
authorities will receive me, or they will not”, but he needed to know where he stood so the IGCR
could move forward.125 Rublee went so far as to guess that the Germans were not actually
hesitant to meet with him at all, but that the British foreign service was holding his negotiation
efforts back.126
Events in the world placed an increasing importance on the IGCR finding some sort of
agreement with Germany concerning emigration. As a result of the Munich Agreement of
September 30, 1938, on October 10, the area of Czechoslovakia known as the Sudetenland was
annexed by Germany, meaning that all Czech Jews and other groups affected by Nazi racial
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laws, fell under the care of the IGCR.127 A few weeks later, on November 9 and 10, the events of
what would later be called Kristallnacht, where German police and citizens perpetrated violence
against Jews still in Germany, impressed upon Rublee the importance of his meeting with
German officials.128
Rublee had two main goals for meetings with Germany, if and when they came. First, he
wished to establish a system for orderly emigration, meaning there would be less illegal border
crossings into countries already overrun with refugees. 129 Second, he wished to find a way to get
the German government to allow emigrants to leave with more of their personal wealth than was
currently allowed.130 The current German emigration laws took a significant amount of material
and liquid wealth from Jews who planned to leave, making them almost destitute. 131 This meant
that many Jews arrived in countries of refuge with little to no money or goods of their own. Not
only did this put a strain on the refugee system, as it meant that both voluntary organizations and,
once private support dried up, governments had to support refugees, but it lowered a refugee’s
chances to be able to emigrate to a nation of final settlement. From the United States to the
Dominican Republic, states that already had rather stringent immigration policies, few states
were truly willing to admit thousands of destitute victims of Nazism when they would, through
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no fault of their own, likely become strains on the relief systems of the countries where they
emigrated.132
As the end of 1938 approached, things began to look up for the beleaguered IGCR. On
December 13, Rublee met with Herbert Emerson, the recently empowered League of Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, to discuss the jurisdictional confusion that had plagued their
organizations. 133 Emerson agreed with Hull and other members of the U.S. State Department in
his belief that Rublee, as Director of the IGCR, had the responsibility to negotiate with Germany,
especially since Emerson was essentially barred from doing so. 134 On the other hand, Emerson
believed that his position as High Commissioner held jurisdiction over working with countries of
refuge and transmigration between those states, though he was more than willing to have Rublee
advise him on such topics.135 However, Emerson was adamant that both the High Commission
and the IGCR had equal rights to negotiate with countries of final settlement on behalf of
refugees, though he welcomed Rublee to continue pursuing the IGCR’s schemes of long-term
settlements, like the proposed ones in the Dominican Republic and the Philippines. 136 For the
most part, both the British and the American elements of the IGCR were willing to accept
Emerson’s idea about the division of labor, though Sumner Welles, the American undersecretary
of state for Europe, wanted to ensure Rublee’s responsibilities would not be reduced. 137
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The second piece of good news was that the IGCR had finally received confirmation of a
chance for Rublee to meet with German officials regarding emigration, though it would have to
happen after the New Year in Berlin, not during the waning hours of 1938. 138 However, this
coincided with German immigration officials sharing their ideas as to what a conjoined IGCRGerman emigration system would look like. In simple terms, Germany recognized some
500,000-600,000 people that qualified as Jews under the Nuremburg Laws and was willing to
institute a system that would see 150,000 of them emigrate at a rate of 50,000 per year for three
years.139 Recognizing that one of the main goals of the IGCR was to ensure that emigrating Jews
were not left destitute upon their departure, the German government offered to allow them to
leave with a portion of their assets, but required that Jews and private organizations outside of
Germany would have to raise 1.5 million in German reichsmarks to fund emigration, though
some 75% of the Jewish assets would be used in Germany to care for Jews while waiting to
emigrate.140 Additionally, Hjalmar Schacht, the German official who shared the plan with
Rublee, “said that as a condition of the plan persecution of Jews would cease.” 141
There was some displeasure with the Schacht plan, both from government and private
individuals. One of the parts of the plan called for the creation of a committee of prominent Jews
from around the world to oversee collecting the funds needed for the plan. 142 However, to
Rublee’s surprise, he found that many in the Jewish community in the United Kingdom were
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unwilling to create such a body, since it might lend credence to the parts of Nazi propaganda that
harped on the existence of “world Jewry.” 143 The U.S. State and Treasury Departments were also
unconvinced that the private organizations so far involved in helping refugees could raise the
requested amount while also fulfilling their current duties. 144 Undersecretary of State Welles was
himself displeased with the tone of the entire proposed plan, saying it “is generally considered as
asking the world to pay a ransom for the release of hostages in Germany and to barter human
misery for increased exports.”145 This last quote was in reference to the German stipulation that
Jewish capital be released only when German exports were at a sizeable profit. Regardless of the
quality of the Schacht plan, it was a step in the right direction, and Rublee met with German
officials to discuss it in January 1939. 146
However, Rublee’s success in finally being able to meet and negotiate a possible way
forward with the Germans, while a victory for the IGCR, provided it with another potential
problem. Rublee had made it clear early on that he viewed his appointment as Director of the
Committee to be temporary and announced his plans to step down upon the completion of his
meeting in Berlin.147 This left the IGCR in somewhat of a bind. On the one hand, it had
successfully met with the Nazi government to begin the process of developing a system for direct
emigration from Germany to countries of final settlement and had been recognized by the
League of Nation’s top refugee official as a legitimate part of the system of refugee care. On the
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other hand, its top executive officer was stepping down, taking with him all of his expertise and
connections. Finding a suitable replacement would be an important, yet exceedingly difficult,
task.
This problem was considered even before Rublee set foot in Germany by Myron Taylor,
the American representative on the IGCR. In a telegram to Secretary of State Hull in late
December 1938, Taylor addressed the need to begin considering Rublee’s eventual replacement.
Somewhat surprisingly for a man who belonged to a state that was not a member of the League
of Nations, Taylor recommended Herbert Emerson for consideration. 148 He had been suitably
impressed by the former British governor, recognizing him as an able administrator. On top of all
of this, Emerson, as the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees, was intimately familiar with
the global refugee crisis and would not need time to get caught up. Nor did Taylor feel that
Emerson’s current position with the League to be a problem. Rather, he felt that combining the
positions of IGCR Director and League High Commissioner in the person of Emerson could be
done while keeping the activities and responsibilities of both positions distinct. 149 Taylor argued
that “this solution would…contribute to greater efficiency, would avoid overlapping and
duplication of authority and would preserve the independent and interdependent relationship of
the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees and the League.” 150 So long as the IGCR was not
subordinated to the High Commission, Roosevelt and Welles supported the selection of Emerson
to replace Rublee.151 After the conclusion of Rublee’s discussions with German officials, Herbert
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Emerson was recognized as both the Director of the IGCR and the High Commissioner for
Refugees.
By early 1939, the situation facing refugees had changed, and some semblance of order
had been imposed, but it still remained uncertain. The IGCR and the High Commissioner for
Refugees had both been instituted as organizations to assist in refugee care and the organization
of emigration, and by 1939 the authority of both of these bodies were vested into one man,
Herbert Emerson. In January 1939, the beginnings of a plan for direct emigration from Germany
was proposed, if not completely settled upon. To coincide with this, plans for long-term
settlement had begun to be developed for the Dominican Republic and the Philippines, as well as
a few portions of British colonial territory. 152
However, these were long-term promises, and the immediate situation had grown dire.
Both Austria and swathes of Czechoslovakia had fallen under German control, swelling the
number of those under the sway of Nazi racial laws and, subsequently, the number of people
fleeing to neighboring countries to escape persecution. To make matters worse, the stringent
immigration laws common in the 1930s had not changed in any meaningful way. 153 It is true that
some states, like the United States, accepted large numbers of emigrants from Germany, upwards
of 27,000 annually for America, but this was insufficient to match the hundreds of thousands of
refugees present in Europe.154 In addition, avenues for emigration had been steadily growing
smaller, as with the now infamous British White Paper of 1939 which essentially cut off any
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further Jewish emigration to Palestine, removing one of the most popular destination for Jews to
immigrate.155
The problem facing the refugee organizations of the world by 1939, both government
supported and those of a private and voluntary nature, was threefold. First, the ongoing fight to
bring order and efficiency to emigration had to be brought to a close, if such a thing was
possible. Second, the need for more outlets for immigration needed to be addressed, either by
convincing states to relax their immigration requirements or by developing sites of permanent
settlement, like those in the Dominican Republic or the Philippines. Finally, the immediate needs
of the refugees for food, clothing, and shelter needed to be filled.
Since the days of Nansen and the original High Commission for Refugees, the realm of
providing direct material aid to refugees had belonged to voluntary organizations. In fact, both
resolutions creating the IGCR and the new office of the High Commissioner for Refugees had
charged that they would not provide direct aid, and the IGCR assured member states that it
would not ask them to provide financial assistance towards its efforts past what was required to
run the administration. In Emerson and the League’s case, he had the funds of the Nansen Office
and the Humanitarian Fund at his disposal, but, as said before, they could only be doled out to
the appropriate voluntary organizations, not used by the Commission itself.
For much of the 1930s, and on into the next decade, voluntary agencies both large and
small admirably looked after the physical needs of refugees. The American Joint Distribution
Committee itself paid nearly $500,000 for supporting Jewish emigrants and networks in Latin
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America alone in 1939, with further payments of $300,000 expected for the first half of 1940. 156
However, by the summer of 1939, they were beginning to reach their limits. The British Cabinet,
whose country itself had taken in some 40,000 refugees that awaited emigration to final
settlements, had received reports that private organizations lacked the funds to support refugees
should they remain in the country for much longer. 157 Such was the case in other countries, and
nations like Belgium had begun to make overtures to the British government for some sort of
solution that would care for refugees without overburdening the government of the state where
they had taken refuge.158
To this end, the Cabinet consulted with Jewish leaders, like Lionel Rothschild, to develop
a plan that allow private organizations to still be able to help refugees despite their dwindling
funds. The plan itself was simple. It proposed a 50/50 split of costs between the British
government and private organizations when it came to support of refugees domestically, and it
was decided that Lord Winterton would present the proposal at the IGCR’s July meeting. 159 The
members of the Cabinet recognized that any plan involving governments being required to
finance refugee support would be unpopular, especially considering that these governments had
been told that they would not have to make such contributions.160 There was also the fact that
any decision to provide funds would have to pass through the legislative bodies of member
states, like Parliament or the U.S. Congress. However, the alternative was the possibility of
having the system as it existed, with private organizations providing an infrastructure that freed
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up governments to focus on other concerns, fall apart. Considering the financial state of other
member states in the IGCR, the Cabinet admitted that the only state that it truly needed to
convince to join in on its plan was the United States. 161
This plan would be a sizeable restructuring of the global understanding of how refugee
care was carried out. Since Nansen’s time, it was assumed that the purpose of intergovernmental
refugee organizations was to coordinate the efforts of voluntary organizations, meaning that the
governments involved would not be expected to spend their own funds to support refugees. The
British suggestion to amend this practice would be first publicly broached by both Emerson and
Winterton at the IGCR’s meeting in London on July 19-20, 1939. However, the July meeting
would also serve as an opportunity for the Committee to reevaluate its current operations and
future plans. As he would do at every other Committee meeting he attended, Emerson opened his
first meeting as IGCR Director by providing a report of the Committee’s activities from 19381939. Emerson informed the gathered representatives that in 1938, some 120,000-140,000
unwilling emigrants had left from Germany, and it seemed likely that 1939 would have similar
numbers.162 Of the tens of thousands of refugees from Germany currently in Europe, Emerson
estimated that around 60,000 were completely dependent on support from private organizations
to survive.163 The overall solution for such a problem was finding permanent homes for all
refugees, but immigration into many nations had been purposely slowed or reduced to an
increasingly small annual number by the governments in charge. 164
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To try and address this problem, Emerson explained three ways forward for the IGCR.
First was a proposal for the Committee to begin supporting the creation of training camps for
refugees.165 These camps would train refugees in a variety of useful fields in the hope that it
would make them more attractive for potential final refuge nations as skilled workers, covering
what weaknesses existed in their own job force. 166 This was a natural progression from the
common strategy used by both the League and the IGCR to survey refugee populations to
determine the various occupations among them and to connect them with interested nations.
The second was the seeming favorite of many member states, the development of
permanent settlements in relatively unsettled land. Emerson reported on possible settlements in
the Dominican Republic, British Guiana, the Philippines, and Northern Rhodesia. 167 All of them
seemed to be promising sites, and some were in the process of being surveyed, with each one
able to hold hundreds, or even thousands, of refugee families. 168 However, many of the locations,
were not able to receive thousands of refugees all at once, meaning the settlements could only be
grown over period of several years. Further, each one came with a sizeable price tag, so they
could not be seen as quick solutions for an increasingly dire situation. 169
Finally, Emerson broached the topic of the British idea for member states to begin
bearing some of the costs of supporting refugees, as well as the result of his and Winterton’s
meetings with the German official Helmuth Wohlthat on June 6, as a sort of continuation of the
talks begun under Rublee.170 Emerson explained the situation of voluntary organizations very
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clearly to the gathered representatives of the IGCR, saying simply that “private charity cannot
continue to meet existing commitments”, further recommending that government and private
funds be combined to help support refugees. 171
The IGCR’s meetings with Wohlthat led to further expansion of the plan Rublee had
developed with Schacht. It consisted of the proposition that two groups would exist to facilitate
emigration, one inside of Germany and one on the outside. 172 The Internal Trust group, the one
in Germany, would gather Jews for emigration and oversee them within the bounds of Greater
Germany, while the Coordinating Foundation, the group outside of Germany, would organize
emigration and permanent settlement.173 Of course, the former conditions of the Rublee-Schacht
plan concerning Jewish capital and how much they would keep upon emigration remained.
While the plan itself sounded more fleshed out and seemed to have a good deal of German
backing, Emerson admitted that he was unsure as to how proactive the German state would
actually be with assistance.174
Winterton followed Emerson’s report on the efforts of the IGCR by formally putting
before the Committee’s representatives the British plan of beginning government funding to
support voluntary organizations. He proposed that the principle set down at the Evian
Conference be somewhat altered, and that governments represented on the Committee pay into a
collective fund that would go towards funding emigration. 175 If this was removed from the
responsibilities of voluntary and private organizations, they would be able to use more of their
funds to support the needs of refugees, thus keeping them from becoming a strain on a country of
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refuge’s system of social support, like the U.S.’s Social Security system, which was meant to be
used only for citizens.
Unsurprisingly, the response to the British proposal was somewhat mixed. Myron Taylor,
the American representative, and Henry Bérenger, the French representative, both said that they
would be more than willing to discuss the plan, but that any agreements concerning money
would have to go through their countries’ legislative bodies. 176 Belgium was soundly in support
of the idea, as it not only had a larger percentage of refugees per its own population than other
nations, but its government was already beginning to give aid directly to destitute refugees. 177
Switzerland agreed with Belgium, as it was in a similar position and was a common destination
for those trying to escape Nazi persecution. 178
The possible beginning of governments assuming part of the cost of emigration was not
the only change to the IGCR recommended at the July meeting. Taylor proposed that it was time
to begin to readjust the IGCR for the period of permanent emigration machinery that, following
Emerson and Winterton’s continued meetings with Germany, seemed to be just on the
horizon.179 In Taylor’s mind, this would involve a reduction of staff to just the executive officers,
those being the Chairman, Vice-chairmen, Director, and a few others, to streamline the operation
of the Committee to be more effective.180 This would reflect that the IGCR had completed its
primary goal expressed in its mandate and would take a supervisory and consultative role should
its negotiations with Germany reach fruition. However, Taylor made no mention of the purpose
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of the IGCR should the plans with Germany fall apart. Regardless, the gathered delegates agreed
to a resolution to see to this proposed streamlining of the operation of the IGCR at the end of the
July 20 meeting.181 They would not discuss the British proposal concerning government funds
until the next meeting of the IGCR in October, where the Committee members would meet in
Washington, D.C. at the request of President Roosevelt. 182
The intervening months between the July meeting in London and the October meeting in
Washington were not kind to the situation that refugees faced. Aside from the usual steady
stream of nations lowering the number of emigrants they would be willing to take, the tensions
that had been building over the course of the 1930s finally burst into open war. By September 3,
1939, Great Britain and France had declared war on Germany due to the latter’s invasion of
Poland, meaning that two of the most powerful members of both the League of Nations and the
IGCR, as well as the states that had the largest population of refugees, were belligerents. 183
These were the circumstances that surrounded the Intergovernmental Committee when it
gathered in Washington for several days of meeting, beginning on October 17, 1939. Two things
were different from the July meeting, with the exception of the outbreak of hostilities, of course.
First, the IGCR was joined in its meeting by representatives from the President’s Advisory
Committee on Political Refugees, a body whose purpose was rather straight forward, chaired by
James G. McDonald, the former High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany for
the League of Nations.184 Second, the Committee was hosted by President Roosevelt himself,
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and he opened the meeting with a luncheon speech in which he hoped to impress upon the other
member states the vision the United States had concerning the IGCR.
Roosevelt began by giving a very brief history of why the Committee had come about,
citing the realization in 1938 that private organizations alone could not handle the masses of
refugees flooding the world, and that the purpose of Evian was to find a long-range solution for
this problem.185 While Roosevelt was still confident of the possibility of permanent settlements
in places like the Dominican Republic and the Philippines, he told the gathered IGCR officers
that the outbreak of war had changed things in two major ways. First, the fact that Germany had
gone to war likely brought to an end the Committee’s ability to help get Jews directly from
Germany to countries of settlement, and Roosevelt recommended that the IGCR redirect its
efforts to help those in countries of refuge reach final settlements. 186 Roosevelt was adamant that
the refugees from Germany’s pre-war actions, which he estimated to be between 200,000300,000, not get mixed in with those the war would create, which he believed could be anywhere
from 10-20 million.187 Second, Roosevelt recommended that the Committee begin to develop
long-term plans for the settlement of millions of refugees in the coming years, believing that the
current plans before the Committee to be too small. 188
After the president’s speech, the IGCR officers gathered for their meeting. Following
opening pleasantries from Hull and Winterton where both commended the IGCR’s ongoing
efforts, Taylor pushed the gathered delegates to consider the points that Roosevelt had brought
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up in his speech, mainly the increased focus on the creation of colonies of final settlement, and
the expansion of the IGCR’s activities to include long-term planning. 189 The French
representative, Ambassador Count de Saitn-Quentin, informed Taylor and the Committee that
France had within its borders some 500,000 refugees, a number that included a large number of
Nansen refugees, and he understood the desire to have a plan for their final placement. 190
However, France and Britain were now at war, and war tended to absorb all of the focus of the
nations involved in it, though Saint-Quentin assured Taylor that France would try its hardest to
assist refugees as it could.191 Following this, Winterton suggested the Committee deal with
Roosevelt’s recommendations following the completion of its original meeting agenda.
As before, Emerson presented his report as the IGCR’s Director since the previous
meeting in July. Unsurprisingly, he reported that communications with the German government
had essentially halted in July, bringing to an end the plans that Rublee had worked to develop. 192
Emerson also reported on the growing number of refugees in Europe, and of the likely possibility
of the Jewish populations of Poland, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the former areas of
Czechoslovakia soon joining them.193 Of course, the war severely hampered any efforts to move
refugees to more permanent homes, and the reality that most of the refugees who were left in
Europe were poor put many of them in an untenable position. Emerson himself suggested that
charitable organizations would soon need to be bolstered by government funds, as was already
happening in the Netherlands and Belgium.194

189

Ibid., 7-9.
Ibid., 11; and Timothy Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy, 19331939," French Historical Studies 12, no. 3 (1982): 440. Maga notes that aside from having a large number of
refugees in its borders, the overall French refugee policy was “a picture of confusion.”
191
Ibid., 14.
192
Ibid., 23, 29-31.
193
Ibid., 27-28.
194
Ibid., 27.
190

55
Emerson also informed the Committee that Britain and, he assumed, France would no
longer be able to accept refugees due to the war. 195 He knew that the British government, which
had some 40,000 refugees in its jurisdiction, was currently going through the process of sorting
friendly aliens from those with possible nefarious intentions so that those who were deemed safe
could begin to work for the war effort.196 Saint-Quentin later informed the gathered officers that
French policy was similar to the British policy for aliens from an enemy power. 197 He concluded
his report by saying that, while the IGCR could no longer help those Jews and other persecuted
groups in Germany, it was not unable to act. It could deal with the immediate problems of
maintaining and supporting refugees in countries of refuge and reduce pressure on these
countries by aiding emigration when possible. 198 Nazism, Emerson assured the representatives of
the Committee, was the reason for the refugee crisis, and once it was destroyed during the war,
Jews would have no problem settling back in Germany.199 As such, Emerson painted the problem
as something that, while difficult to address, was ultimately a temporary and a straightforward
task for the global community once Nazism was defeated.
Following Emerson’s report, McDonald, as the head of the President’s Advisory
Committee, presented a report on one of its favorite subjects: settlement projects. The two
projects he discussed, one in Mindanao in the Philippines and the other in the Dominican
Republic, sounded incredibly promising, being able to become the home of tens of thousands of
refugee families combined. However, each one would require a trial settlement of only a few
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hundred refugees for a few years to test the viability of the location, and each one was incredibly
expensive to develop, some $5 million for the Philippines settlement alone. 200
The remaining discussions of the October meeting were mixed. The Swiss representative
informed the officers that his nation was being overburdened with refugees, and due to the strain
on private organizations the Swiss government had 3,000 refugees under its care. 201 This
prompted Winterton to once again broach the topic of joint government funding by Committee
members that he had brought up in July. Once again, Taylor was uncertain as to whether or not
he could give any sort of definitive support to the plan, but both the Dutch and French
representatives agreed with the British idea of a 50/50 split of costs with private organizations. 202
Winterton also received support from McDonald, saying that his extensive contacts in the realm
of private organizations could no longer bear the full burden of emigration and settlement,
stating succinctly, “they just cannot.”203
On the other hand, there was an increased fervor behind the discussion of permanent
settlement colonies, perhaps because it seemed like the only feasible vein of work left open to
the IGCR during wartime.204 Emerson expressed great interest in McDonald’s plans, and the two
arranged to meet informally with heads of American voluntary organizations in New York in the
coming months.205 This renewed confidence in settlements carried through to the end of the
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meeting, with the officers resolving to consider expanding the Committee’s responsibilities to
include settling millions of refugees, as Roosevelt had suggested, and many were coming around
to the idea of governments funding refugee support more directly. 206
As 1939 came to a close and the war continued, the landscape of international refugee
care changed. Due to the difficulties incurred by the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, many of
those intimately involved with the refugee system had to turn increasingly to the domestic
concerns of refugees. Such was the case with Herbert Emerson. While he still held the position
of both IGCR Director and League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, he was called
upon by the British government to help organize the support of refugees following the
implementation of the 50/50 plan. This decision followed the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee’s choice to pull support of refugees in England in favor of those in Eastern Europe,
who they felt needed its support more. 207
The British government’s response to the JJDC’s withdrawal was the placement of
Emerson as chair of something called the Central Committee for Refugees, joined by Neill
Malcolm, the former High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany. Essentially,
Emerson, and those under his direction, would work directly with the representatives of
voluntary organizations to distribute government funds to offset the costs the organizations
incurred while providing refugees with either assistance emigrating or with physical aid. 208 The
hope was that, while the government would now be bearing some of the cost for aiding refugees,
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it would still be able to make use of the experts and administrative framework of voluntary
organizations to do the day-to-day work.
This Central Committee served as a sort of go between for the British government and
voluntary organizations, where groups would make claims for what they were owed from the
government, and Emerson and his fellow members examining these claims and confirming
them.209 Emerson was also involved with how the internment system of aliens in Britain was to
work, creating lists of activities internees should be allowed to take care of themselves and
allowing internees to work for the war effort and their own betterment. 210 Emerson’s work with
the League did not end with his assumption of domestic responsibilities, however. In 1939 and
early 1940 he travelled to various European countries to gain a better understanding of the
situation faced by Nansen refugees, ensuring that they were not forgotten since the outbreak of
war.211 The war was cutting into his ability to operate as High Commissioner, however, as the
spread of the war to other countries in Europe was slashing access to funding. 212 Regardless,
Emerson still involved himself in looking after refugees from Germany as well, making sure that
they were treated properly in camps while they were being examined for trustworthiness, and
trying to stay abreast of internees movements out of camps. 213 Emerson had focused the
Commission on arranging for travel visas for refugees moving around Europe, securing safe
passage for refugees on neutral ships, and intervening on behalf of refugees in legal matters. 214
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Despite the earnest efforts of Emerson and others, the German advance on Europe made
what had been a tenuous situation in peacetime seem almost hopeless. From May 10 to June 25,
1940, a brutal onslaught by the German forces saw the conquest of the Netherlands, Belgium,
and France, all three of which had been havens for large numbers of refugees. Emerson himself
had been present in Belgium just days before it fell.215 Needless to say, this terrible defeat of the
Allied forces impacted the fate of refugees tremendously. Soon after the fall of France, the
British government instituted more stringent internment rules to guarantee national security
while doing the least amount of harm to refugees who, by and large, were just as opposed to the
Nazis as the British.216 Emerson’s Central Committee was responsible for helping volunteer
organizations evacuate refugees from now off limits areas, usually near the coast, to safe zones
and camps.217 Emerson was recommended by members of the War Cabinet to be the ViceChairman for a special committee to handle the separating of aliens and working with voluntary
organizations to care for internees, as well as finding them work. 218 Both Malcolm and Winterton
would similarly be placed on this committee, and Malcolm and Emerson would also be placed on
an advisory committee to the Home Secretary on the application of interment rules. 219
Emerson was also affected by the fall of France. In his High Commissioner report for
1941, he discussed the slow loss of contact with many of his representatives in other countries,
though he was still in contact with his representative in France, Marcel Paon, who had wisely
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moved to Pau from Paris before its fall.220 From the information he gathered, he concluded that
“military events have closed this chapter of refugee history in the Netherlands, Belgium, and
France.”221 Emerson also reported on the introduction of a new class of refugees, those caused
directly by the war, some 25,000 who fled to Britain from the Low Countries. 222 While these
were among the first reported, they would not be the last.
The IGCR was moving forward with its plans for settlement colonies, and Emerson was
involved in the selection of 400 refugees for the settlement at San Domingo in the Dominican
Republic, which was already under way by 1941, although he realized that it would take several
years to develop the promise of just one of the settlement colonies. 223 McDonald’s efforts to
expand this program were continually frustrated, however, as he would periodically receive
reports from Undersecretary of State Welles that certain plans, like one in Brazil, were being
rejected.224
By 1942, the situation was truly dire. Emerson had been receiving disturbing reports on
the treatment of Russian and Jewish refugees in occupied countries, and he reported on the
existence of camps with appalling conditions.225 Of course, he and his subordinates helped as
they could, and his Deputy Commissioner, Dr. Gustav Kuhlman, facilitated the flight of 70
Russian Jews through Portugal.226 Indeed, the Commission was still trying to aid the travel of
any who could escape the reach of the Nazis, and Emerson pulled what strings he could as
Director of the IGCR to facilitate emigration for those in the United Kingdom who wished to
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travel to the United States.227 For the most part, Emerson could do little more than gather
information and report it to those who would listen. In his 1942 report as High Commissioner he
gave special notice to information he had received regarding the movement of Jews from Austria
and Germany to conquered territories in Poland and France, stating that he believed total
deportation was the goal.228 Peter Fritzsche details the growing intensity and terror of Nazi
forced movements of Jews in 1941-1942, and Marion Kaplan gives keen insight into the
increasing pressures Jews still in Germany faced. 229 Emerson would still be one of the leading
figures of refugee care when he learned the truth. Perhaps due to this attention to gathering
information of the situation in Europe, as well as his connection to almost every major refugee
program, he was asked by Allied leaders to participate in talks concerning the post-war world
with the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau. 230
To this end, both the League of Nations and the Western powers, led by the United
States, created new bodies to deal with the new refugee crisis. The League’s new High
Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Herbert Emerson, had the combined responsibilities of those
under the care of the Nansen Office as well as the coordination of care for those now outside of
Germany, while providing no direct aid. The result of the Evian Conference had a similar
limitation, though a different mandate. The Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees was a
way to connect countries of refuge with countries of final settlement and facilitate emigration
from one to the other. It was also to bridge one of the major gaps of the League’s abilities to help
refugees and deal directly with Germany to set up a system of direct emigration.
227

Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 4.
229
Peter Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press,
2008), 143-147, and Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 150-154, 173-180. The entirety of these works help to
provide key insight into the Jewish plight within Germany and are recommended sources for any seeking to learn
more about the subject.
230
Report Submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson, February, 1942, 13.
228

62
Despite the diligent efforts of the Committee’s first Director, George Rublee, the best
thing to come from its negotiations with Germany was a plan that was unsatisfactory for all
involved, though its plans to develop settlement colonies in Latin America and the Philippines
showed some promise. In the end, the powers of the two refugee bodies were married in the
person of Emerson, though ostensibly the actual bodies were kept separate. This was in an effort
to increase the efficiency of interactions between the League and the IGCR, but it must also be
admitted that, as a former governor in India, Emerson had more administrative experience than
Rublee.
Regardless of Emerson’s abilities, he could do little to improve the deteriorating situation
on his own, as the state of immigration laws in 1939 made it impossible to move large groups of
refugees anywhere at all. The system of quotas did ensure that some Jews and other refugees
were able to emigrate from Europe, which would eventually save their lives, but it was not
enough to solve the problem. 25,000 a year, to use an American quota number as an example,
plus small numbers of thousands or hundreds from other nations saved lives, but the reality
remains that many thousands were left behind. 231 Those left were soon languishing in poor
conditions, as the funds of private organizations began to wane. This led Emerson and the British
government to broach the sensitive topic of governments directly funding, in some way, refugee
care, whether it be emigration or aid. It had become a necessary action for countries like the
Netherlands and Belgium, and as voluntary organizations like the JJDC turned to refugee
populations not under competent governments, it seemed the only way forward. By the end of
1942, it was clear to most that the refugee system that had been made before the war was
insufficient to meet the task before it, but the question of how to fix it remained unanswered.
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Chapter 3: Emergent Necessity
In the face of the ascension of the Nazi party to power in Germany in the 1930s, and the
swelling of Jewish and political refugees who fled in the face of increased persecution, the
nations of the West gathered to create order out of chaos. The League of Nations, withering due
to a series of missteps in its handling of crises, married two of its organizations, the Nansen
Office and the High Commission for Refugees (Jewish or other) from Germany, to create the
office of the High Commissioner of Refugees, a restoration of a body created to handle refugees
in the 1920s. However, there were limits in how far the League’s new High Commissioner, Sir
Herbert Emerson, could go for refugees from Germany, namely, his inability to actually
negotiate with Germany once it left the League. To fill this gap, all the sizeable nations of
temporary refuge that were contiguous with Germany, and many nations of final refuge, gathered
at the behest of the United States at Evian, France in 1938.
The result of what would later be called the Evian Conference was the creation of the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, or the IGCR, a body tailor-made to negotiate with
Germany to create an orderly system of emigration between Germany and nations of final
refuge. Despite its youth, the IGCR was quickly incorporated into the international refugee
system, aided by the naming of Herbert Emerson as its director in 1939, meaning both the major
intergovernmental refugee organizations were headed by the same man. As the troubled year of
1939 progressed, it seemed like the IGCR would find some success as negotiations with
Germany started and several countries of final refuge, namely the Dominican Republic, promised
to take in thousands of refugees if only a system was made.
Despite this slow progress, the hopes of the IGCR were dashed with the outbreak of war
in September 1939. All of the IGCR’s efforts ground to a halt, and it faded largely to the
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background as the Second World War engulfed Europe. The various heads of refugee work
remained dedicated to their efforts, as voluntary organizations struggled to save and support
refugees, and Emerson, head of two refugee bodies, used his resources to gather information,
help where he could, and organize domestic refugee work in his home of Britain.
However, as the war progressed, and the efforts of the Allies began to show that victory,
while still distant, could be secured, the Western powers turned once again to the question of
refugees in Europe. This concern was spurred by growing reports of atrocities committed by the
Germans against those they deemed to be “others”.232 This renewed interest led the Allies back
to the mostly dormant IGCR, as well as a number of new ideas on how to care for refugees. 1943
and 1944 proved to be years of key development for the Allies’ refugee programs, as
organizations were reshaped and new ones created not just to obtain immediate results, but to
address the looming difficulties of an influx of post-war refugees.
In early January of 1943, Emerson, the man who could be considered the foremost leader
of intergovernmental refugee work, penned an article for Foreign Affairs, titled “Post-War
Problems of Refugees”. The article serves as a sort of memorandum of how Emerson viewed the
refugee situation which the Allied powers faced in 1943. He gave a generous definition of what a
refugee was, saying that it included any people who had to leave their homes because of military
operations or because of political, racial, and religious persecution. 233 This included not just
those displaced by the war, but also those displaced before hostilities even began. Emerson
predicted that, by the end of the war, these refugees would number more than ten million, using a
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figure he first heard from President Franklin D. Roosevelt at a meeting of the IGCR in
Washington.234
In Emerson’s mind, this refugee crisis could be divided into two relatively easy to
understand sections: the short-term and the long-term. The actual period of the short-term was
left undefined by Emerson, as he felt unable to guess as to the actual end date of the war, but he
qualified that it included time during the war, as well as anything five years after the end of
hostilities.235 Short-term work mostly involved physical relief, but also involved the coordination
of voluntary refugee organizations and repatriation of all of those refugees who would desire to
return to their homes.236 Emerson felt, and was largely correct in this belief, that both refugee
organizations and Allied military forces would work in tandem concerning immediate relief and
repatriation.237
The long-term refugee problem involved those displaced who did not wish to return to
their homes following the close of hostilities, either due to wrongs done on them by their people
or changes in their home country.238 Emerson felt that this number of “true refugees” would be
small in comparison to the larger body which would simply seek repatriation, but that even this
small number would prove troublesome to single governments and would exceed the abilities of
private organizations, meaning it would be an issue for all of the Allies. 239 To this end, Emerson
recommended the development of an intergovernmental Allied body that would be responsible
for the group of non-repatriables, with the express goal of making stateless persons cease to be
stateless, which he referred to as an International Refugee Authority. 240 While Emerson spoke on
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this possible future entity as a separate and new thing, he acknowledged that either of the
organizations he led, the League’s High Commission and the IGCR, could be reorganized to fit
this need.241 Whatever path was chosen, either reorganization or creation, the body to help longterm refugees had to help them in four ways: assist in returning those who eventually changed
their minds about wanting to go home; work for the absorption of refugees into their countries of
refuge; oversee normal immigration to countries of final settlement; and, all other options being
exhausted, resettle them to a new area. 242
While it is difficult to ascertain the impact of Emerson’s article in the realm of refugee
work that existed in 1943, his understanding of what the future of the refugee system looked like
proved to be sound. Similarly, his four methods of handling non-repatriables would be
something he would tout into the post-war world. However, while Emerson wrote most of his
article about creating an organization for refugees, reorganization was the strategy that the two
largest powers on the IGCR sought.
In January 1943, the same month that Emerson had his article published, the United
States and Britain found themselves under immense public pressure to respond to a growing
knowledge of Nazi atrocities, as well as a declaration concerning the extermination of Jews
released in late 1942.243 This pressure followed the increase of news reports on Nazi mass
killings in mass media, and with a growing, if murky, public understanding of Nazi atrocities,
protests and demonstrations on behalf of victims followed. 244 Churches and individuals alike
began to appear in newspapers pushing for more government and public support for Jews. 245
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That is not to say that there were not those who were less than willing to assist the victims of
Nazi persecution, many wished to cut off immigration in total, and there was a minor uproar in
Canada when just 200 families were brought to Canada for temporary refuge to lessen the
amount of refugees in Spain.246 In the face of this complex pressure, the British began to reach
out to the United States concerning the landscape of refugee work. The British government
suggested a private conference on the general problem of refugees, to avoid media attention and
giving the public false hope concerning what could be done for Jews, and expanding the scope of
concerns to all refugees, not just Jewish ones.247 According to Sjöberg, the British feared that the
dormancy of the IGCR during the first few years of the war made it anathema to the public and
were more inclined towards creating a new body rather than restructuring an old one. 248
The United States, however, had no such inclinations. When the State Department finally
responded to the British, several weeks after the message had been sent, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull informed his counterparts that further efforts to support refugees were better left to
a body which already existed, like the IGCR.249 To this end, the Americans recommended the
convening of an Anglo-American conference to discuss new ways to address the refugee crisis
during the war, especially regarding the IGCR. 250 The initial location for the conference was
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Ottawa which, after a minor diplomatic crisis due to the Canadian government not being
consulted beforehand, was changed to Bermuda, and set to gather between April 19-30, 1943. 251
The conference occurred in Bermuda in late April, away from the prying eyes of the
media, as well as an increasingly volatile public, which had earlier gathered in crowds
approaching 50,000 at Madison Square Garden in protest of German atrocities. 252 Both the
United States and Britain were represented by a small group of four per side, headed by
Congressmen R. Borden Reams for the Americans, and Foreign Office officials led by A.W.G.
Randall, leader of the Foreign Office Refugee Department, for the British. 253 It should be noted
that there were no members of the Executive Committee of the IGCR present. Nor were there
some of the more familiar people with the situation of refugees, like officials of the JJDC, with
the notable exception of George Warren as an advisor for the American delegation, the State
Department’s specialist on refugee affairs and a member of McDonald’s Advisory Committee.
This was, for the most part, purely a meeting between statesmen. Emerson, however, did write
several memorandums to educate the conference members on the general situation the world
faced in 1943.254
The agreed upon basis of discussion for the conference fell into four categories:
solidifying the understanding that more minorities than just the Jews were suffering under the
Nazis, exploring how the United Allied Nations could use their resources to transport and
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support refugees, examining the possibility of temporary asylum for refugees outside of Europe,
and finding precise ways to organize actions and executive machinery for refugees. 255 These
baseline concerns led the gathered delegates to topics like simply trying to define the scope of
the refugee crisis, to the specific situation of refugees in Spain, the Balkans, to overall AngloAmerican recommendations for the entire situation.256
The several days of discussions in Bermuda resulted in several agreements, chief
amongst these was the desired reorganization of the IGCR. The delegates of the conference
recognized that the original mandate of the IGCR was no longer suitable for the current refugee
problem, as its scope of concern was limited to German, Austrian, and Sudeten refugees, and its
main stated goal was negotiating with Germany for a system of emigration. 257 The delegates at
Bermuda recommended that the IGCR revise its mandate to encompass all of Europe and
wherever refugees found refuge, and that its purpose and powers were to preserve, maintain, and
transport refugees, as well as negotiating with Allied and neutral countries on behalf of
refugees.258 The scope of those the IGCR was responsible for was expanded to be those who had
to “escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion
or political beliefs,” which was a sizeable number of those displaced both during and before the
war.259 It was also recommended that the Executive Committee of the IGCR be empowered to
handle and distribute both public and private funds, a power which had been a subject of intense
debate amongst the members of the Executive Committee prior to the war. 260
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Recommendations did not just stop at those concerning the Committee’s scope and
powers. The American and British delegates also recommended that the membership of the
IGCR be increased from just those contiguous countries of immediate refuge and countries of
final settlement, but all those concerned with the refugee question. 261 There was also a
recommendation that the IGCR expand its staff to deal with its increased powers and scope, and
several specific matters, like finding new refuge for Poles in Persia, were referred specifically to
the Committee. Perhaps as a result of the British fear that the image of the IGCR had been
tainted, Randall and Richard Law floated the ideas that it may have been time for Emerson and
Lord Winterton, the Chairman of the Committee, to be replaced by younger men. 262 While
complaints against Winterton had been previously levied, removing Emerson seemed unlikely,
since he was the man most familiar with the refugee problem and intergovernmental
organizations, and he would still be a factor to be dealt with even if he was replaced considering
his position as League High Commissioner for Refugees. Indeed, little came from these
suggestions of administrative replacement. Despite the impressive sounding changes made to the
IGCR at the conference in Bermuda, most everything was kept hidden from the public, likely in
an attempt to not get hopes up or back the Allies into a corner, and media releases from the
conference simply explained that agreements were made to help refugees. 263
Two things were needed for the changes recommended in Bermuda to be placed into
effect. First, there was a concern held by Myron Taylor, the head of the American delegation to
the Committee, that just changing the mandate of the IGCR and its ability to handle public funds
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would not be enough to guarantee that member states would let it practice this power. To this
end, he requested that Hull petition Roosevelt to allow the United States to share the operational
costs of the IGCR equally with Britain for its plans to help refugees to a certain, reasonable
point.264 Roosevelt, trusting the advice of two of his favorite diplomats, approved Taylor’s
suggestion.265 This guarantee of funds promised that the IGCR would have something to draw
from when it finally decided on operations to fulfill its mandate, but, as Sjöberg points out, this
promise of Anglo-American operational funds also threatened to turn the IGCR into an
instrument solely of those two nations.266
The second step that was required to have the Bermuda recommendations take effect was
to actually have the IGCR agree to them. This was no small feat, since the Executive Committee
had not gathered for a meeting since October 1939, and there was the question of whether or not
a full session of all the members of the Committee would be needed to confirm any changes to
the mandate. The concern over what size of meeting would be required was sorted in a meeting
between Taylor and British Ambassador Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax, in June 1943, where it
was confirmed that only a meeting of the Executive Committee was required. 267 Whether this
was a decision made due to the correct interpretation of Committee procedure, or just
convenience, is up to debate. Finally, the date for the first meeting of the IGCR’s Executive
Committee in nearly four years was set for August 4, 1943, in London.
A preliminary agenda for the meeting, compiled by Winterton, Emerson, and Randall, set
a sizeable list of tasks for the Executive Committee to address. Of course, there was the expected
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necessity of approving the changes of Bermuda, as well as confirming the states in which
invitations for membership would be sent. 268 However, there were new additions to address as
well. First was a slight amendment to the expanded mandate from Bermuda which qualified the
IGCR’s mission to helping “as many as practical” who had fled their homes due to race, religion,
or political beliefs.269 This slight change still allowed the Committee to assist in an expanded
way but gave it an out should an unrealistic scheme be presented before it. Next was the need to
fill several new positions following the recommendation of an expanded staff from Bermuda,
namely a full-time Vice-Director and Secretary. 270 The Executive Committee also had to be
made aware of the Anglo-American offer to cover funds for actionable projects, though with the
explained caveat that all plans would have to pass through Anglo-American scrutiny, meaning
both members would have to agree on the practicality of the plan, before being enacted. 271 This,
in the mind of Sjöberg, represented another shackle placed on the Committee by the United
States and Britain.272
Coupled within the preliminary agenda that Emerson developed was also a point stating
that the IGCR needed to define its relationship with an organization that Emerson called the
“United Nations Relief Administration”.273 What Emerson was referring to was a body that
would come to be known as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, or
UNRRA, which was in the process of being formed over the course of 1943. The body was a
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progression of several Allied agencies, like the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, or
OFFRA, and the Allied Post-War Requirements Board, and was to be a non-political
organization to provide relief for the victims of war. 274 Though the body would not be formally
created until November 1943, those involved in the maintenance and development of
international refugee systems were well aware of its future existence, and if it was to help with
refugees, its relationship with the IGCR would have to be defined. One of the first times the two
bodies and the finer workings of their relationship were first referred to together was during the
conversation between Taylor and Halifax in June. Taylor felt that UNRRA would be far more
focused on the immediate relief of refugees and victims of war, what Emerson might describe as
short-term concerns, before they could be moved, either back home or to places of new
settlement, which would be an action of the Committee. 275 Earlier, in a memorandum from May,
Borden Reams, the same man from Bermuda, explained another quirk to the two refugee bodies’
relationship. Since UNRRA was a body of the United Nations, another name for the Allied
powers during war time, it was a real possibility that neutral states, like Spain or Switzerland,
would object to having them on their soil, whereas the IGCR, a body from peacetime, had no
such restrictions.276
Regardless of these finer points, the agenda was accepted, and the first Executive
Committee meeting of the IGCR since 1939 was successfully completed on August 4, 1943.
Emerson was reconfirmed as Director of the Executive Committee, Patrick Malin, an American,
was selected for the position of Vice-Director, the revised mandate was ratified, and the IGCR’s
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working relationship with the League’s High Commission, through Emerson, was
reconfirmed.277 From the conclusion of the August 4 meeting until the end of 1943, Emerson and
the Executive Committee’s main concern became defining how this new mandate affected the
IGCR, and how it would work both during and after the war. It was, one could say, a period of
redefinition.
One of the groups that the IGCR had to redefine, or at the very least reassert, its
relationship with were the various voluntary organizations it had been working with since 1938,
since its mandate of just organizing emigration had changed. Previously, it had been very much
like a version of the League’s High Commission, but with American representation, in the fact
that it simply coordinated the efforts of voluntary bodies. By mid-1943, however, the IGCR was
technically responsible for the care or transport of refugees in neutral territory, or soon would be
at the conclusion of hostilities. However, this responsibility came upon the Committee rather
suddenly, meaning that it lacked the boots on the ground to really do anything for refugees,
pushing it to turn to its relationship with voluntary organizations once again. In Sjöberg’s mind,
this reliance on voluntary organizations to serve as the Committee’s agents to refugees was a
failure to fulfill one of the recommendations of Bermuda, that being to expand the personnel and
staff of the Committee as a whole. 278 However, this view is a short-sighted as this was simply the
way the refugee work had been done up until this point. For example, the first intergovernmental
attempt at handling refugees, the League’s High Commission for Russian Refugees, established
using voluntary organizations as the hands of relief as a matter of course. Indeed, Emerson never
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seemed to entertain the idea that the Committee would fully handle all relief operations in areas
under its mandate.279
Emerson divided the IGCR’s new relationship with voluntary organizations into two
parts: how they would interact with it and it with them. Emerson wanted to open more channels
of communication with refugee organizations, which meant sharing more information with them
in the hopes to receive some in return, being more accessible to deputations from organizations,
and perhaps inviting individuals with special knowledge from these organizations to future IGCR
sub-committees.280 However, Emerson stressed that the IGCR would have to be cautious in how
it interacted with the voluntary organizations it would get to carry out its duties on the ground.
Many of them were politically motivated, which was outside the bounds of the IGCR’s aims.
Emerson stated that, “the merits or otherwise of a free Austria after the war are not their (the
IGCR’s) concern, nor should they get involved in the political side of the Palestine question.” 281
The IGCR and its agents were free to urge governments towards more liberal policies concerning
refugees, but in a reasonable way.282 For the most part, Emerson’s efforts to refine the
Committee’s relationship with voluntary organizations was accepted, though Hull cautioned
against allowing any personnel from a voluntary organization to sit on a sub-committee, advising
that they be called as witnesses when needed instead.283
Emerson was also behind the creation of a press release on October 26, 1943, which
explained to the American and British public for the first time the results of the Bermuda
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Conference in more detail.284 The details were scant, but for a public that was becoming
increasingly more aware of Nazi depredations and more accusatory, it was something. 285 The
communique explained the list of countries that were invited to join the efforts of the IGCR,
noted the expansion of its mandate, and offered the assurance that the Committee and UNRRA’s
efforts would not needlessly overlap, but that one would oversee Allied states and liberated
territory, and the other would oversee neutral states and the refugees therein. While better than
nothing, the communique would prove insufficient to completely head off public and
governmental concern regarding the fate of Jewish and other refugees, as Assistant Secretary of
State Breckinridge Long’s appearances before Congress in the late fall to explain the refugee
situation attests to.286 Long had been called before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a
secret meeting, where he sought to convince Congress that the United States and the reformed
IGCR was doing all that could be done to help Jews in Europe. His comments, which were
eventually made public, impressed Congress, but actually caused backlash from those both for
and against more refugee aid, as some felt not enough was being done, while other envisioned an
impending flood of refugees.287
Emerson and the other Executive Committee members’ understanding of how the new
mandate of the IGCR affected its operation was not just limited to redefining old relationships
but also the development of new functions of the Committee. One of the most concrete examples
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of this was the efforts to establish representatives of the IGCR in the countries of its operation
beginning in late 1943. Emerson proposed the appointment of representatives in Lisbon, Madrid,
Algiers, Naples, and Ankara to assist with refugees. 288 These representatives would vary from
country to country, but overall, they would oversee local IGCR activities and be directly
responsible to the Director and the Executive Committee. 289 The countries themselves were
chosen due to the high level of refugee activity they saw, from the refugee camp at Fedhala in
North Africa, or the large amount of refugee transit in Portugal and Spain. By the end of 1944,
the IGCR would have representatives in Rome, North Africa, Washington, and Italy, though it
would never be able to secure representatives in perhaps the most crucial nations of Spain and
Portugal.290
While 1943 proved to be a year of reinvention, if rather muted in its overall effect, for the
IGCR, it proved to be a somewhat strange year for the League’s High Commission for Refugees.
Like the IGCR, the High Commission was forced into relative dormancy due to the war,
relegated to gathering what information it could concerning the situation in Europe.
Unsurprisingly, especially considering the fact that the Commission was also headed by
Emerson, much of its time was also spent in trying to plan for post-war refugee action, as a
sizeable portion of Emerson’s 1943 High Commissioner report is dedicated to this topic. 291 Even
as details were given of ominous movements of refugees to the East or loss of communication,
Emerson continued to plan for the end of the war.
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However, 1943 proved to be a rather remarkable year for the Commission in two ways.
Firstly, it was becoming more integrated into the IGCR itself. Despite the early assurances that
the authority of the Director of the Committee and the High Commission could be separate
despite being endowed to the same man, it was only natural that the two began to merge
somewhat. Emerson often reported that the staff of the offices of both positions, which were
housed in the same location, worked almost interchangeably between the two organizations. 292
Not only this, but by November 1943, Dr. Gustav Kullman, the Deputy High Commissioner for
Refugees, was appointed as Honorary Assistant Director of the IGCR. 293 Kullman was a natural
choice because he was well acquainted with international law and, as a Swiss citizen, had well
placed contacts within the neutral state that the IGCR was having increased relations with. 294
Kullman’s appointment made even more sense considering he was already visiting Switzerland
for the Commission, and his status as Deputy Commissioner assured that he was well acquainted
with the refugee situation in general. 295
The Commission’s efforts extended beyond its incorporation into the increasingly
American led refugee systems of the IGCR. In September 1943, Emerson wrote to the United
Nations, as they existed during the war, through the American ambassador in London. Humbly,
Emerson admitted that he was unsure as to the proper way to make representations to the United
Nations, and he hoped that the American ambassador would send his request forward
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properly.296 Emerson wrote as the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees, and he sought to
address the possible expansion of U.N. action. On January 5, 1943, the United Nations and the
French National Committee issued a statement declaring that property belonging to those
residents in conquered territory would be subject to restitution, though the declaration did not
extend to those in enemy lands or property lost due to actions before the war. 297 Emerson
petitioned the United Nations to expand this declaration to include those persecuted by the
enemy governments in their own territory, areas under their occupation, or indirect control. 298 In
his mind, it would be unfair to provide restitution for those who were able to escape in the face
of the enemy but not those who could not. 299
Of course, as with so many of Emerson’s plans, his concerns were not limited to moral
rightness, but also post-war planning. In his mind, providing restitution for those in German
territory who had lost property due to Nazi laws would push more refugees to repatriate
following the close of hostilities.300 While nothing resulted from Emerson’s appeal, it is
important to note that he attempted to use his League office for the betterment of the future of
refugees, and that he petitioned the United Nations as the League’s High Commissioner, rather
than the Director of the IGCR.
If 1943 was a year for the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to work towards
defining its new existence with the revisions of Bermuda, 1944 would prove to be more of the
same. As previously mentioned, UNRRA was created by a resolution of the wartime United
Nations in Washington in November 1943, though it would be mostly embryonic until the late
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spring and summer of 1944.301 In addition to this U.N. body, the IGCR also had to contend with
the American War Refugee Board, created by Executive Order 9417 on January 22, 1944,
ostensibly to assist with the rescue of victims of oppression who were in danger of death. 302 This
meant that there were two organizations that the Committee had to set clear boundaries of
responsibility, mandate, and jurisdiction. Since UNRRA was the more long lasting and
consequential of the two organizations, the relationship building between it and the IGCR will be
covered first.
Since late 1943, Emerson and others on the Committee had sought to define definitively
the relationship between the IGCR and UNRRA. Emerson recognized that the mandates of the
two bodies overlapped somewhat, as the Committee’s concern for anyone who had been
persecuted and displaced due to religion, race, or politics would surely include the nationals of
Allied nations, which was UNRRA’s concern. 303 However, he believed they covered one
another’s weaknesses. UNRRA was responsible for the maintenance of refugees and displaced
persons within an area it operated in, even those that were technically the responsibility of the
IGCR.304 However, this maintenance, which included the provision of food and clothing, the
establishment of refugee camps, and repatriation, did not include the long-term problem of
placing those who did not wish for repatriation.305 In other words, UNRRA could care for
refugees, but it had no ability to place them anywhere other than their countries of origin, a gap
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the Committee filled. The IGCR also complemented UNRRA in its more pronounced abilities to
negotiate directly with governments on behalf of refugees concerning employment or legal rights
and its capacity to gather information on individual refugees, a function that the League’s High
Commission had utilized since the 1920s. 306 Of course, it is hard to quantify as to whether or not
these specific aspects of the IGCR and UNRRA’s complementary relationship were ever brought
to bear. Regardless, the basic principle of cooperation was confirmed at the Atlantic City
Conference in November 1943, where the finer points of how UNRRA would operate were
confirmed.307
An example of how the IGCR and UNRRA could work together took form, on paper,
concerning the Fedhala refugee camp in North Africa. The camp itself had been first established
in 1943 as a result of discussions at the Bermuda Conference with its purpose to gather refugees
in North Africa and to provide an outlet for refugees from Spain. UNRRA took control of the
camp in 1944.308 UNRRA was in charge of the maintenance and running of the camp, though not
the educational rehabilitation of those therein, no doubt a consequence of its stated apolitical
nature.309 Emerson and the IGCR felt that their relationship with Fedhala, while residuary, was
still very real. The IGCR representative in the area of Fedhala, Algiers in this case, would be
responsible for gathering information on the refugees in the camp, communicating with refugee
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organizations since it had a longer relationship with them than UNRRA, and working on the
emigration or employment of those in the camp who did not wish to repatriate home. 310
UNRRA also had the difference of being more closely related to the Allied military
forces. As Emerson surmised in his article from early 1943, the first steps of repatriation would
be largely handled by military forces, and UNRRA was tailor made to work alongside the Allied
military by using its supply systems and resources. 311 Of course, the actual time for this
transition from military to civilian authority in refugee maintenance was never officially
established, something that would become a point of contention at the end of the war. UNRRA’s
relationship with the Allied military also ran the risk of it not being a favored mechanism of
neutral countries, a concern of some that has been mentioned earlier, meaning the existence of
the IGCR provided assurance for refugees in places like Switzerland. Regardless of how clear
cut these distinctions between the two bodies seem, it was a continued topic of discussion
throughout 1944, covered at meetings of UNRRA and during Emerson and Malin’s visit to the
United States in the early spring and summer. 312
The other new refugee body the IGCR had to work with was the War Refugee Board,
created in January 1944. On the Board sat Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, with John Pehle as Director. 313
The Board was broadly responsible for the rescue and maintenance of persecuted people from
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enemy territory.314 For the most part, however, this boiled down to facilitating the movement of
refugees to the rear of Allied forces. 315 However, there were some rather unique powers afforded
to the Board. It controlled the issuing of licenses to American organizations for the transferring
of funds abroad, usually for relief work.316 The Board also held the ability to practice
psychological warfare, usually in the form of threatening charges of war crimes on those who
committed atrocities against refugees. 317 There were also certain areas of refugee work where the
Board was active that the IGCR chose not to be, like the Balkans. 318
There were some questions amongst the higher ups in the U.S. State Department, such as
Assistant Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, as to why the IGCR existed if the Board had been
established and was helmed by the three of the most powerful and influential men in Roosevelt’s
Cabinet.319 As with the IGCR and UNRRA, there was a fear of wasteful redundancy. But it was
generally understood that the Board was a short-term body made to deal with emergent refugee
problems as they came about, not long-term concerns like resettlement or legal rights for
stateless people.320 The effort to gain this clarity was not easy, and Emerson and Malin, on a trip
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to Washington in April to secure the beginnings of their promised operational fund, met with
Board officials a number of times to clarify relations. 321
The IGCR’s efforts during 1944 were not solely limited to defining its relationship with
new refugee bodies. As already mentioned, it had begun to send a number of representatives of
the Committee into regions that were intimately connected to the refugee question. While these
representatives would do some good, their overall impact was not as significant as what could
have been.322 However, the Committee’s most effective action in 1944 was the development of
what would later be called the “Credit Scheme”. This plan was first brought to the IGCR during
one of Kullman’s visits to Switzerland, in which he became aware of private efforts to protect
and rescue those who were being victimized by the Nazis. 323 This discovery prompted a meeting
between Emerson, Winterton, and Dr. Joseph Schwartz of the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee. Schwartz informed the two IGCR officers of a scheme it had developed
in which organizations and individuals would use their funds to extend credit to the JJDC, which
would use the credit to support or rescue what Jews and other refugees it could. 324
Emerson immediately saw promise in the idea, and petitioned the British and American
governments for the dispersal of funds from the operational budget, which they controlled, to be
used as credit for the JJDC.325 Not only did he believe that the Committee could spare the funds
considering it had no major on-going operations, but he believed IGCR involvement would
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stimulate, rather than replace, the involvement of more private individuals and organizations. 326
This request of joint action by the JJDC matched a request from the International Committee of
the Red Cross in December 1943 for the IGCR to provide 300,000 in Swiss francs for the relief
of those in concentration camps like Theresienstadt. 327
Emerson’s petition was accepted by the Americans and British, and funds were
authorized for use in the JJDC’s “credit scheme”, though, as a sign of the tight hold the AngloAmerican bloc had on the organization, member states of the Committee, even those on the
Executive Committee, were not told of the extension of funds until November 1944, for fear they
would view it as weakening the blockade of Axis controlled Europe. 328 In total, the IGCR
funneled $1.28 million to the JJDC for projects in France, Rumania, Hungary, and Italy, which
included anything from material aid, assisting groups hiding Jews, and paying ransoms for Nazi
prisoners.329 Sjöberg and Wyman are somewhat dismissive of this action by the IGCR, feeling
that, considering the promised scope of its new mandate, this was a weak return on investment.
However, this plan certainly contributed to the saving of lives, however small the number, and is
significant in the fact that it was discovered and investigated by members of the IGCR, acting on
their own behalf.330 Considering the lack of action on the Committee’s part for most of the war,
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this delivering of funds is somewhat of a wonder. It was also a way for the United States to
directly fund rescue operations without having to petition Congress for additional money.
The final large action of the Intergovernmental Committee in 1944 was the convening of
a full Plenary Session of the Committee in mid-August. This gathering of 30 member states of
the IGCR would serve as a way for the various states involved to be caught up on the
developments that had occurred over the course of 1943-1944. 331 Emerson, as Director of the
Executive Committee, informed the gathered delegates of the revised mandate that had come
about as a result of Bermuda and detailed the actions of several officers of the IGCR during the
past few months, such as Malin’s visit to several countries overseas and the actions of the IGCR
representatives who had been appointed. 332 The Plenary Session also served as a time for
Emerson and the other members of the Executive Committee to answer the questions plenary
delegates had concerning the revised Committee, such as the delegate from India’s question as to
whether or not the IGCR would be responsible for refugees in China. 333 Emerson also took any
opportunity he could to reassure the gathered delegates that the sudden increase of governmental
bodies made to handle the refugee crisis, mainly UNRRA and the War Refugee Board, was
nothing to worry about. He explained that the increase of those the IGCR had to share the stage
with was a result of the fact that during wartime “it is necessary to bring a battery into action
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rather than a single gun. This is all to the good, so long as the job is done it does not matter who
does it.”334
The Plenary Session of August also served as an opportunity for the IGCR to develop
more permanence for itself, as well as set an agenda for the upcoming year, which looked
promising, since the liberation of France had been moving apace since the successful completion
of the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944. The permanence came in the form of the establishment
of a constitution, rather than just a mandate, for the six-year-old organization. This constitution
highlighted how the Executive Committee operated, how voting for measures was to be handled,
and other particulars of how the IGCR functioned. 335 The passage of the more permanent
constitution rather than operating on just a mandate alone is almost ironic, considering within
two years the IGCR would essentially cease to function.
The IGCR’s general agenda set by the Plenary Session was twofold. First the Committee
resolved to dedicate itself to increased cooperation with the League’s High Commission,
UNRRA, the International Labor Organization, and the War Refugee Board, mirroring
Emerson’s sentiment that more groups working on the refugee problem bettered the chances of
positive results.336 This resolution included the offer that the organizations mentioned above
were free to send observers to watch and participate on sub-committees and meetings the IGCR
convened, a privilege that had been extended to Malin and Emerson by UNRRA. 337 The
Committee also resolved to begin investigation of the creation of travel documents and passports
for refugees who were now stateless. This had been a concern mentioned at the Evian
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Conference in 1938 and had been a system that was experimented with by the League’s High
Commission under Dr. Fridjof Nansen, though the Committee declared it was never fully
realized and could be put into wider application. 338 As such, the Committee gave itself an
actionable goal to work towards, though, as had become a trend, it was a post-war concern,
rather than one immediately relevant to saving refugees.
The final months of 1944 progressed rather quietly for the IGCR, as it focused on
planning and information gathering. Emerson and Kullman, acting in their capacities for both the
IGCR and High Commission, took advantage of the tide of liberation in Western Europe and
visited nations like France and Switzerland to gather information on their refugee situations and
to look into government care of refugee children that was coming into practice in France. 339
UNRRA, on the other hand, began to incorporate itself into the Allied military system and had
been operating in the Balkans since May 1, 1944. 340 However, its relationship with Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF, would not be formally recognized until
November 25, 1944, which subordinated it to the military body in many ways. 341 As such,
UNRRA would not fully become responsible for the immediate relief of refugees until the
dissolution of SHAEF which meant that it, like the IGCR with all of its planning and information
gathering, was truly waiting for the end of hostilities to come into its own.
1943-1944 proved to be years of revision for the IGCR, though the streak of dormancy
that began with the advent of hostilities would, for the most part, continue for the League of
Nations’ High Commission for Refugees. The IGCR would see its mandate expand, and had
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greater powers and responsibilities placed upon it. It would also engage in the most impactful
effort it was a part of during the war, its credit scheme with the JJDC. The League’s Commission
found itself becoming more and more intertwined with the IGCR, as its workers and officers,
mainly in the form of Kullman, took up responsibilities with the Committee. Despite this fact,
Emerson believed the Commission, rather than the IGCR, was the proper body to petition the
wartime United Nations for the expansion of restitution guarantees to those in enemy territory
from before the war. Both entities would have to deal with the creation of several new refugee
bodies, most notable in the form of the War Refugee Board and UNRRA. With this in mind,
intense effort was put into trying to define the relationship and jurisdiction of the various
governmental and intergovernmental refugee organizations to avoid wasteful overlap and to
ensure that everyone was working towards the ultimate good of refugees.
However, the astute reader may be able to recognize that, despite the large number of
meetings, telegrams, and conferences held concerning refugees during this period, few concrete
results were actually attained. This is a fact that has not gone unnoticed by those who have
studied the refugee situation during World War II. Sjöberg is critical of, in his mind, the failure
of the IGCR to fulfill the resolutions of Bermuda by continuing to use voluntary organizations as
its boots on the ground.342 Wyman is even more critical, railing against the Committee’s lack of
large scale rescue operations, Emerson’s focus on post-war concerns, and many other things
besides, writing the body off as a failure for refugees, but a successful smokescreen for the Allies
to point to whenever asked about their handling of refugees. 343
While these historians are right to be critical of the actions of those involved in the IGCR,
especially those in the State Department like Breckinridge Long, they are somewhat unfair in
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their critiques. In Sjöberg’s case, there was never any indication on the Committee’s part,
especially from Emerson, that the IGCR would seek to be a large-scale relief organization like
UNRRA. There was an understanding that the organization and stimulation, rather than the
replacement, of voluntary work was one of the key goals of the Committee. 344 Nor did the IGCR
have access to the sort of funds that would allow itself to work on the scale Sjöberg mentions, as
he himself recognizes.345
Wyman, while reasonable in his critiques of personnel chosen by the IGCR, also
stumbles in his argument in that, at times, he seems to forget that the Committee was operating
during wartime. Written into nearly every single charter and mandate of the major refugee
organizations was the understanding that their operations would in no way adversely affect the
successful execution of the war. If Emerson and the Committee could somehow have been able
to get the Nazis to release thousands of Jews to their care, which in itself is a questionable
proposition, what was to be done with them? Shipping them elsewhere than Europe would
threaten the efficacy of the shipping lanes of the Allies and chartering a significant number of
neutral ships would create a serious need for funds. Of course, there would be a public response
to such a move as well, and if the Canadian public had balked at the idea of receiving a few
hundred refugee families from Spain, what could Emerson and the Committee do in the face of
the outcry from delivering tens of thousands of refugees to various Allied nations? 346 If they
were kept in Europe, the Allies’ military supply lines would be stretched to support the influx of
humanity, hampering the eventual push into Germany. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, leader of
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the Allied military forces, remarked frequently at the end of the war how the state of Allied
supply lines negatively affected the refugees and displaced persons under his care. 347
Nor does Wyman sufficiently address the question of what would have to be given up to
get the Nazis to release Jews and other prisoners. Would the Allies have to release POWs,
thereby giving the German military more men to extend its war with? Would it have to give
copious quantities of money, thereby hamstringing the very blockade the Allies had set up? That
is not to say that there were not chances that the Americans and the members of the IGCR in
general had to help refugees, but the scale of assistance called for by Wyman was never even in
consideration due to the cruel calculations of war. As Feingold notes, “such a miracle was never
in the power of Washington.”348
Both of these authors also fail to address the fact the Emerson was well acquainted with
the failings of the Committee. In a telegram to Myron Taylor, he lamented that “until the
Committee can produce concrete results, it will not attain the status which is essential to its
future success.”349 Emerson knew that the public was hungry for results in aiding Jewish and
other persecuted groups, but that the results that they wanted to see were hard to produce during
wartime.350 Emerson’s awareness towards the failings of the Committee could be the reason
behind his focus on the post-war problems that would be faced concerning refugees since, during
the war, there was little he could do. Regardless of his reasons, it was for the post-war world that
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Emerson continued to plan and, as the end of the war inched closer and closer, the true
effectiveness of the reformed IGCR and its fellow refugee bodies would soon be tested.
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Chapter 4: To Be Human Again
The years from 1943-1944 had been a sort of preparatory period for the Allied
governments and the refugee organizations they had created in the face of World War II. As the
war progressed, the major powers were more focused on winning the war before they tried to set
up a definite system for those tossed like flotsam in the war’s wake, leading them to work with
what they had. Organizations that had existed before the war, like the Intergovernmental
Committee for Refugees, were reevaluated and reformed in an attempt to make them more able
to both deal with the refugee crisis that existed during the war and plan ahead for the problems
that would follow the eventual peace. New entities were also created and incorporated into the
international refugee system, most notably the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration and the War Refugee Board. All three of these bodies, the IGCR, UNRRA, and
the War Refugee Board, as well as the diminished League of Nations High Commission for
Refugees, operated within the same realm of providing aid to refugees and to assist in
reincorporating them into the global community. A significant amount of time was spent, then, in
the form of meetings, telegrams, and conferences to explain and define the mandates and
jurisdictions of each body, with the hope that wasteful overlap and bureaucratic pettiness could
be avoided. The test of the elasticity of this system began in 1945.
The efforts of these various international bodies to handle the staggering number of
refugees in the years following the conclusion of hostilities have often gone unnoted. While the
entire experience of many of these organizations was one of confusion and overlap, as described
by Proudfoot in his seminal study of the problem, it was also one of continuity. Specialists of
every stripe were consulted to try and help, in some way, with the immediate problem and, most
importantly, to lay the groundwork of handling refugees in the future. A new world order was
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created, not to prevent war, but to alleviate its horrible aftereffects. This attempt to solidify the
international responsibility of refugee care by people like Sir Herbert Emerson and Earl G.
Harrison, or the IGCR and UNRRA, was not just a story of new practices, as described by
historians like Daniel Cohen, but one of taking past knowledge and reapplying it. 351 As such,
through confusion, adversity, and tremendous effort, a relatively small group of men and women
succeeded in creating a new system of refugee care, one which exists to this day.
By January 1945, it seemed clear that the Allies were going to defeat the Axis powers.
However, the situation that the Allied powers faced was staggering. The onslaught of the armies
of Nazi Germany had forced millions of people from their homes, from Poland to France, and the
racial laws of Hitler’s party forced thousands of Germans and Austrians from their homes even
before a single shot was fired. Nearly 11 million of these people were killed systematically by
the Nazis in an attempt at racial purification, including nearly 6 million Jews. The Allies, led by
the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union soon found themselves in the position of
needing to care for the nearly 10 million refugees left in Europe following the close of the war. 352
Finally, the time had come to begin to set in place, in a more structured way, the order of the
world after the war. To this end, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin,
accompanied by their military and foreign policy advisors, gathered at the Yalta Conference in
the Crimea from February 4-11, 1945.353
The main concerns of the Yalta Conference were threefold: the creation of an
organization, what would eventually be the United Nations, to assist in peacekeeping, the
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question of what to do with Germany upon its defeat, and the war with Japan. 354 Indeed, the
general question of refugees, outside of how it fell under the category of restoring order to
Europe, rarely came up. However, considerable time was spent discussing specific classes of
refugees and POWs, especially when they were Soviets. Over the course of the Yalta
Conference, the three leaders signed reciprocal agreements concerning the return of refugees and
POWs.355 What these agreements guaranteed was that any POWs or refugees belonging to one
state that were under the protection of another, like an American POW being in Russian hands
after his liberation from a camp, would be returned to their country of origin as soon as possible,
overseen by UNRRA or a nation’s armed forces. 356
This push for repatriation, or returning a refugee or displaced person to their country of
origin, included those who did not want to return, though this sentiment mostly included Soviet
refugees and POWs.357 However, chiefly because any delay in returning Soviet POWs and
refugees would mean that their own POWs would not be returned, and the assumption that the
Red Army would be needed to defeat the Japanese, the United States and Great Britain
repatriated some 2 million Soviet refugees in the summer of 1945. 358 At the same time, the
Western members of the United Nations refused to return any refugees who were not in the
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Soviet Union before the outbreak of hostilities, protecting many Ukrainians and Poles from
undesired repatriation.359
This trepidation extended even to those who technically should have been repatriated, the
best example being the British government’s attitude towards the Polish Home Army. This was
the democratic government in exile from Poland, and its administration and troops had been
close allies with Britain since early in the war. Following the conclusion of the Yalta Conference
on February 11, the British government commissioned a study to consider the feasibility of
absorbing the Polish armed forces who did not wish to return to their homeland, because of the
fear of poor treatment from the new Soviet backed government. 360 A few things can be noted
from this British study. First, it is noted that careful consideration was given as to how these
Poles fell into the various responsibilities of UNRRA and the IGCR, indeed, Emerson was
contacted specifically to be told that the British government were looking into the problem. 361
Second, the British were very unsure as to how to proceed, as they had to consider questions of
whether or not their possible granting of nationality to thousands of Polish soldiers and their
families was setting a precedent, specifically mentioned is the question of whether or not Jews
would see it as something available for them. 362 Finally, it was decided by those conducting the
study that Great Britain, including all of its various colonies and territories, could not shoulder
the weight of absorbing all the Poles and that the new United Nations would need to assist. 363
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Of course, the refugee problem that unfolded in 1945 was larger than just those Poles
unwilling to return to their former home, and as Allied forces moved further into Axis territory,
the problem only continued to grow. By the time of Germany’s surrender in May 1945, the total
number of refugees held in various camps and centers by the Allies had swollen to around 10
million, meaning that even if the 2 million Soviets who were quickly repatriated were subtracted,
there were still 8 million people who needed to go somewhere. 364 The various refugee
organizations made by the Allies helped as they could. UNRRA assisted in moving liberated
refugees to the rear of the advancing forces, providing clothing and food, and offering
rehabilitation services.365 Ostensibly, it was also to help with repatriating those who had been
displaced by the war, though this was slow until near the end of hostilities. 366
The actions of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and the IGCR, still
headed by Emerson, are somewhat more nebulous to pinpoint, though they are still real and
assisted the overall effort of aiding refugees. By the spring of 1945, the League had been all but
dismantled, with only a few of its offices technically still in operation. Despite this, Emerson
dutifully made his yearly report as was required of his position as High Commissioner, and one
can see that the League’s few resources had turned to information gathering regarding refugees
in Europe. Emerson’s High Commissioner’s report can be broken down into three main parts.
First, there is his general description of the refugee situation in Europe, as it pertained to the
League. This included the number of refugees currently counted that were under the League’s
umbrella, some 130,000, the various difficulties these groups might face with repatriation, and
how other governments were working to help these refugees, most notably the French, Swiss,
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and Belgian governments.367 Second, Emerson demonstrated his full utilization of both the IGCR
and UNRRA in obtaining information and support for refugees who fell under the Nansen
Office. This came in the form of getting an UNRRA agreement that it would provide material
support for Nansen refugees in Greece, or his multiple references to using IGCR representatives
in other countries to gather information for refugees under the League’s care. 368 Considering how
the High Commission and the IGCR had grown closer during the two years before the war
ended, this multi-organizational usage of resources by Emerson is not surprising.
Finally, Emerson used his report as an opportunity to begin detailing how the question of
the refugees could be answered by the global community in an official capacity. Most of the
comments and recommendations Emerson made in his 1945 High Commissioner report mirror
comments he made in his 1943 Foreign Affairs’ article, like the idea of there being two groups of
refugees and three different ways to handle them. 369 The most notable difference is the fact that
in his Foreign Affairs article, Emerson gives a fourth method for helping refugees, mass
resettlement, which he omitted here.370 He noted that there seemed to be two forms of refugees
forming, those who simply needed care and support until they could be repatriated, and those,
who he called “dissidents”, that had no desire to return to the place they were displaced from,
and Emerson explained, these dissidents were mostly German Jews. 371
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In Emerson’s mind, in June of 1945 at least, there were three ways to address this crisis
and get refugees settled: repatriation, absorption, and individual emigration. 372 Repatriation has
already been discussed and had been the primary goal of refugee bodies since the first League of
Nations High Commission was made to assist refugees from World War I. Absorption was the
practice of refugees eventually becoming naturalized by the countries where they had sought
sanctuary in, though as the British government’s study showed, such a thing was not very likely
to happen with large groups of refugees. 373 Individual emigration referred to a single person
going to a family member who lived in the United States or some other country, getting
established, and then having the rest of his or her family follow. 374
The IGCR was similarly in the business of information gathering and policy formation
concerning refugees. Unlike UNRRA, which was to work more directly with those who had been
displaced due to the war, the IGCR existed by the spring of 1945 to fill in the gaps left by the
relief agency. These gaps focused heavily on administrative assistance to those on the ground,
working with neutral nations, and the consideration of the future of refugee assistance. This
could take the form of Emerson and other members of the IGCR staff personally meeting with
the governments of liberated nations like France to learn how they could help refugees within the
country, and the IGCR had actually signed an agreement to specifically aid several groups in
France.375 Or, sending representatives to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) to create instructions for field commanders in how to treat displaced persons, advise on
the creation of displaced persons centers, or tour those that currently existed. 376 Primarily,
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however, the IGCR was most involved with coordinating the efforts of the various volunteer
agencies that worked to assist refugees, like the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee,
or the International Red Cross, to ensure there was no wasteful overlap, to consider the question
of permanent refugee resettlement, and to help those refugees that did not fall under the
jurisdiction of UNRRA.377
One can see, then, that during the period following the Yalta Conference, UNRRA and
the IGCR tried to operate in the complementary relationship that had been agreed on in the few
years before the war’s end, with UNRRA being the arms of relief and the IGCR being the mind,
considering the best way to proceed in the present, and the future. Indeed, Emerson described,
yet again, his opinions on how the refugee crisis could be brought to an end in his 1945 IGCR
Director’s report, though he included the fourth point from his comments in Foreign Affairs to
his previous three in his High Commissioner report. Repatriation, absorption, and infiltration, or
individual repatriation had remained on his list, but they were followed by a fourth, group
settlement.378 Emerson, having previously noted the reality that many European Jews would not
want to return to their former countries following liberation, explained that the best way to
address this problem was potentially moving large groups of Jews to their desired destination,
usually Palestine.379 Interestingly, this additional way to assist refugees was being considered by
more than just those that were part of the refugee system, as new U.S. President Harry S.
Truman, had toyed with the idea of opening Palestine to more Jewish refugees at the Potsdam
Conference in July 1945.380
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Of course, the actions of the IGCR tended to be somewhat distant from the actions on the
ground. Since even before the cessation of hostilities in May 1945, UNRRA and the Allied
armed forces, under the direction of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had been responsible for the
repatriation and care of the various refugees and POWs that they liberated from either hiding or
Nazi imprisonment since 1944.381 According to the decisions of the United Nations and its own
executive council, UNRRA was to work hand in hand with SHAEF and the various other Allied
forces in their joint mission concerning refugees, as well as directing voluntary organizations on
the ground.382 However, it was limited in how it could operate. Primarily, this resulted from a
certain mindset amongst military officers that the concerns of UNRRA were the concerns of
peacetime, which would be late in coming. 383 There was also the reality that, while UNRRA was
supposed to direct the actions of voluntary agencies, it was the actions and systems of supply
organized by the military which really moved these groups. 384
UNRRA was also handicapped by its own makeup and stated directive. The agency had
been made to assist those who had been displaced directly because of the war and to help with
the speedy repatriation of these displaced persons, especially after the signing of the Reciprocal
Agreements at Yalta.385 While this was surely needed with the millions flooding the rear of the
Allies’ lines, it was also limiting. Any refugee that had not been displaced by the war or
belonging to a neutral nation like Spain did not fall under UNRRA’s net. 386 UNRRA was also
not responsible for the resettlement of those, like German and Austrian Jews, who did not wish
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to return to their homes, meaning it could only feed and clothe them as they sat in their camps,
nothing more.387 These limitations were to be shored up by the IGCR in the form of long-term
resettlement plans and negotiations with nations of final settlement, but there was only so much
that the IGCR could do, short as it was on boots on the ground and having to rely on voluntary
agencies to fill this role.388
Despite their shortcomings, UNRRA and SHAEF repatriated displaced persons at a
staggering rate, beginning immediately upon the agreements made at Yalta, but truly picking up
speed around March 1945.389 By the end of March, around 350,000 displaced persons had been
repatriated, and by September 30 of the same year, some 6,795,000 had been repatriated, from
unwilling Soviets to thankful Frenchmen.390 The hard work of UNRRA and SHAEF also led to
the creation of a guide for the care of displaced persons that was issued to all subordinate
military commanders.391 Despite the herculean efforts of SHAEF, ending in July 1945, and
UNRRA, there was a growing reality that the simple repatriation of earlier 1945 was not all that
would be needed to answer the refugee question. This had been a reality accepted by some of
those in the refugee system, like Emerson or Myron Taylor, for some time, though an exact
estimate for how large the group would be was elusive. By the summer months, it had become
obvious that there were around 2 to 3 million displaced persons who either did not wish to return
or had other complications that prevented easy repatriation.
That is not to say that everyone in the realm of refugee care was pleased with the job
being done by SHAEF and UNRRA. From June to August 1945, Earl G. Harrison, the American
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delegate to the IGCR that replaced Myron Taylor and the former Director of Alien Registration
and Commissioner of Naturalization and Immigration, was tasked by President Truman to
investigate the situation of displaced persons, especially “non-repatriatables”, under the
military’s care.392 The report covered the situation of refugees, what immediately needed to be
done, and what should be done in the future. Harrison began his report by first noting the success
of the military in caring for displaced persons, namely the fact that nearly 4 million people had
been repatriated by the time his report was written, and that there had been great improvement in
the conditions in displaced persons camps since the beginning of the year. 393 The rest of the
report, however, was more negative towards the military officers in charge of the situation.
Harrison described the immediate material situation of many of the non-repatriatables,
especially German and Austrian Jews, as being somewhat dire, considering they had been under
the Allies’ care for several months. Many displaced persons claimed to have been kept in
buildings that were unfit for the coming winter; indeed, many were being kept in the very
concentration camps they had been imprisoned in months prior to liberation. 394 Food, while
noted to be difficult to come across for all of occupied Germany, was unacceptable for displaced
persons, and Harrison even claims that the defeated Germans had a more varied diet than those
they had previously killed en masse. 395 Harrison viewed the camps he visited so poorly that he
warned Truman that the defeated Germans may take the current state of displaced persons as a
condoning of Nazi actions by the victorious Allies. 396
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Harrison expressed frustration not just with the state of refugees, but how their immediate
needs were being met. UNRRA, he claimed, was neither organized nor equipped to handle the
entire scope of the millions of refugees who seemed to be a long-term problem for the Allies, and
even in those faculties that it was competent, it had been neglected by camp commandants. 397
Harrison was right, of course, as UNRRA had not been created for such long-term issues. 398 The
preoccupation with mass repatriation, conducted mostly by the military though aided by
UNRRA, had relegated the agency to trying to coordinate the efforts of voluntary agencies. 399 As
previously mentioned, however, UNRRA was not always successful at controlling the voluntary
groups that, technically, answered to it. Regardless of that fact, Harrison claimed that even the
voluntary groups, which had decades of experience, were not always used by the military. 400
Suffice it to say, Harrison felt that the military was not as successful as it could have been in
refugee care, and that it was not even properly using the resources specifically put at its disposal
to fill in the gaps.
However, the purpose of Harrison’s report was not just to decry the failings of the
military, though there are some historians who tend to stop there, like Orchard, but to offer
possible solutions to the budding non-repatriatable situation. 401 These fell generally into three
categories. The first was the obvious idea that the military needed to begin handing the reins of
refugee care over to those who specialized in it, something that had been understood since the
inception of bodies like UNRRA, but a process which had never been fully defined. 402 Harrison
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was appreciative of the military’s work, but he described the status of liberation to be liberation
in a “military sense”.403 It is obvious to see that Harrison was not surprised by the military’s
inability to give displaced persons the attention they deserved, as it was also tasked with
restoring order and rebuilding occupied Germany. 404 He admits time and again that the military
had gone above and beyond its goals of simply moving liberated persons to the rear and then
aiding in their repatriation, saying “praise of the highest order is due all military units with
respect to this phase of the post-fighting job. In directing attention to existing conditions which
unquestionably require remedy, there is no intention or wish to detract one particle from the
preceding statements.”405 Regardless, Harrison still felt that it was time for bodies like UNRRA
and the IGCR to be given control.406
Second, Harrison described actions that could be taken to improve the current physical
state of refugees. Aside from better accommodations and improved diets, this included the
placing of Jewish displaced persons into their own separate camps. 407 In Harrison’s mind, the
Jews had suffered a longer and more grueling plight at the hands of the Nazis than any other
group of displaced persons and required the kind of special care and aid that could only be
administered in a separate camp.408 Other services, like tracing the whereabouts of family
members who were also interned so they could be reunited, could be offered at these camps, and
a service of this sort was something that the IGCR had been working on since 1944. 409 All
refugees, however, Jewish or not, would benefit from an increase in facilities that would assist
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them in physically recovering from their ordeal, improved housing, better access to contact with
the outside world, and opportunities to be hired for jobs in the camps. 410
Finally, Harrison described what, in his mind, would be the ultimate solution to the
refugee problem: resettlement. He recognized that a small number who could gain admittance to
the United States and other parts of the world, but it would not solve the whole problem of the
almost 2 million remaining displaced persons. 411 Hoping these people, both those who did not
desire to return to their now communist nations and Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, would
cave and accept repatriation was also unlikely, considering the ordeal they had survived. 412
Rather, Harrison suggested that the correct move forward was to allow increased amounts of
immigration to Palestine, which had been slashed to a minimum by the British government. He
requested Truman do what he could to see this through. 413 Improved care and a focus on the
resettlement of non-repatriatable Jews to Palestine fell in line with Harrison’s belief that “the
civilized world owes it to this handful of survivors to provide them with a home where they can
again settle down and begin to live as human beings.” 414 It is interesting to note that three of the
most involved men in the lives of refugees, Emerson, Harrison, and Truman, had in the latter
months of 1945 all come around to the idea that resettlement, not full repatriation, may have
been the way forward for the United Nations.
There were many in the military who were less than pleased with the conclusions of
Harrison’s report. Even though he repeatedly mentioned the impressive work of the military in
aiding displaced persons, and his acknowledgement that there were exceptions to every case he
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mentioned, many, like General Eisenhower, felt that Harrison did not fully appreciate the scope
of the situation. A few weeks after the publishing of his report, Harrison wrote to the secretary of
state in Washington expressing frustration with the Department of War. 415 Harrison felt that he
had already acknowledged that the various exceptions that were brought up to refute his report
existed, and that the SHAEF guidelines, which were also used as evidence of the incorrect nature
of his report, had never lived up to the lofty goals they prescribed. 416 To his credit, as has already
been mentioned, SHAEF guidelines concerning the treatment of refugees were not mandatory
rules for military commanders.
Whatever Harrison’s best intentions, there were reasons for the military to chafe at his
report, though this had little to do with Harrison and his report and more to do with how his
findings were transmitted. From the very beginning of the reporting of Harrison’s findings, the
media oftentimes chose to focus on the most sensational, and negative, remarks of Harrison, and
tended to ignore the most important parts of his report, aside from those concerning Palestine. 417
The military bristled at the charges of some papers that it was treating the Jewish refugees under
its care as the Nazis did. After all, hundreds of thousands of soldiers had just died to defeat the
Nazi regime, and many military leaders took the chance to attack the charges and Harrison’s
report.
As one could imagine, it was General Eisenhower who seemed to take the greatest
offense to the articles printed in the newspapers after the release of Harrison’s report. Since the
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cessation of hostilities in Germany, Eisenhower had been tasked with trying to restore order to
the American occupied portion of Germany, keep order amongst his troops, and care for the
millions of refugees who had come into the care of the Allied forces. 418 Eisenhower had shown a
consciousness for the needs of the countless displaced persons under his care, noting as early as
May 1945 that improvements would have to be made for their accommodations in the face of the
coming winter.419 He was also astutely aware of how the stressed state of the Allies’ logistics
made life harder for displaced persons. 420 Eisenhower was not a heartless military man who had
no time for his civilian charges. He was very aware of their needs and had worked in some way
to address them.
In a series of letters to Truman, Eisenhower sought to explain and defend his position in
Germany. Eisenhower stated that he was beginning a tour of the various camps under his
command, something recommended by Harrison, and he acknowledged that some of his
subordinates may not have been following his directives. 421 However, he pointed out that neither
the rabbi who he had added to his staff to help advise him on Jewish matters nor Jewish relief
agencies had complained about his conduct toward Jewish displaced persons. 422 He also
defended the concentration of refugees into a relatively small area, explaining that it was to aid
with the distribution of resources and to prevent crime. 423 He further rebuffed the accusations of
Harrison’s report concerning former concentration camps still being used to house refugees and a
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lack of employment for refugees by stating that only those medically unable to move were still in
concentration camps, and that more and more opportunities for employment were being
created.424 Not all of Eisenhower’s complaints and defenses were quite so well worded or
diplomatic, as in a letter to General George C. Marshall, where he opined that Harrison was still
“shouting from the housetops” about the poor treatment of displaced persons at the hand of the
military.425
Regardless of whether or not Eisenhower agreed with all of Harrison’s complaints, the
report caught the attention of the person who had commissioned it, President Truman. Upon the
release of Harrison’s findings, Truman pushed Eisenhower to address several of the most glaring
complaints levied against the military’s care of displaced persons, and Eisenhower, perhaps
recognizing that the military had gaps in its care, readily complied, despite his protests of unfair
treatment. This compliance came in the form of a directive released to all his subordinate
commanders, which addressed the need of good sanitation, proper facilities, frequent inspections,
and employment opportunities for displaced persons. 426 These reissued guidelines, as opposed to
the SHAEF guide created with UNRRA, carried the threat that any personnel not following them
would be immediately relieved of duty. 427
As 1945 neared its conclusion, the United Nations, meaning both the Allied powers and
the organization created at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, was in an interesting
position in its relation to refugees. The systems and agencies that had been made during the war
to address the problem, like UNRRA, to those that existed before the war, like the League’s High
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Commission and the IGCR, as well as voluntary groups like the American Joint Jewish
Distribution Committee, had done tremendous work when combined with the efforts of the
military. More than 6 million refugees had been repatriated, and those that had yet to be
repatriated were being cared for in camps which stretched from Italy to the eastern edge of
Austria.428 However, this care represented a problem in that the crisis of refugees had not ended,
and, according to Harrison, some 2 million refugees remained under the care of the international
community. The global community’s tried and true method of handling refugee populations,
working towards repatriation, would not be sufficient for large swathes of those who had not
returned home during the summer.
The question remained, who was to care for these refugees left behind? As has been
discussed, there was a delicate dance that was played out by both UNRRA and the IGCR, and
the weaknesses of both groups had been made evident over the summer, during the time of mass
repatriation. The IGCR lacked feet on the ground or a large staff to truly handle the concerns of
population resettlement. UNRRA, meanwhile, was somewhat limited by its own mandate and
was seemingly hamstrung in its reliance on military commanders and voluntary agencies. It
would be an easy case to make to say that this fractured refugee system was too confused for its
own good.
Some of the administrators involved, however, could see through the almost impenetrable
web of jurisdiction. In his 1945 report as Director of the IGCR, Emerson tried to explain how the
current system of displaced persons care should work. UNRRA and the IGCR complemented
one another, with UNRRA holding wide responsibilities to help those displaced because of the
war, the largest group of refugees by far, and the IGCR assisting those displaced before the war,
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or belonging to neutral nations, a sentiment he spent much of 1944 defining. 429 Ultimately,
Emerson would argue that UNRRA was nothing more than a temporary organization, lacking
both the mandate and authority to deal with the long-term problems of things like resettlement. 430
Presumably, then, the responsibility for refugee care and resettlement would eventually fully go
to the IGCR, even though, by Emerson’s own admission, it had not been able to fully consider
questions like migration by the final months of 1945.431 If Emerson, who represented the world’s
authority in population resettlement as the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
had not been able to puzzle out how the various refugee systems could proceed, than the refugee
question remained unanswered, and the system made to answer it remained in an eclectic state. 432
Britain, however, seemed to have reached the conclusion that the fractured refugee
system needed to be reexamined. At its Fifth Plenary Session from November 20-22, 1945, the
IGCR delegates gathered to discuss not only the actions of their organization during the past
year, but also a message from the British government which stated that it would be requesting
the United Nations consider making a more comprehensive refugee organization. 433 Emerson
himself had toyed with the idea of making a more robust refugee body in 1943, something he
called the International Refugee Authority.434 By the time the British request was made known to
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the IGCR, its responsibilities had swollen to include, not just those who did not fall within the
mandate of UNRRA in displaced persons camps, but numerous refugees in France, around
200,000 Spanish refugees, the possible transport plans of 10,000 Jewish refugees in Shanghai,
Italians in New York state, and the coordination of voluntary groups, especially from America. 435
The British proposal acknowledged the tireless efforts of the IGCR and UNRRA, but it
noted that neither of them were fully equipped to deal with the number of refugees who could
not be returned home because they had none, either through denationalization or choice. 436 As
such, the British recommended that the United Nations consider the creation of a body which
would permanently oversee the refugees left from the period of mass repatriation, though this
new organization would not destroy the IGCR, rather, it would absorb it and rely heavily on its
expertise.437 Reactions to the proposal were generally positive, with the delegates of both France
and Switzerland recognizing that the system needed change, and restructuring under the United
Nations’ direction could possibly bring harmony to the confusion that was reigning. The French
delegate did specify that he wished to deal with a United Nations committee, rather than the
entire General Assembly, to which Emerson replied that he wished they would interact with the
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council.438
Emerson’s own opinions were somewhat more balanced. He first reminded the gathered
delegates that the IGCR had been created to deal with the long-term question of refugee
settlement, meaning that the Committee could not simply stop its work should the United
Nations investigate helping, for if it failed to make progress, they were all that remained. 439 He
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was willing to recognize, however, that the original mandate of the IGCR did not match up with
the policy the Committee had undertaken the past few years, or even its current capabilities. 440
The goal of the IGCR in its discussions with the United Nations, should the delegates accept the
British proposal, would be to protect what it had built should it be absorbed. In Emerson’s mind,
this included the various conventions, agreements, and relief systems which were convened and
agreed upon under, or recognized by, the IGCR. 441
This fell in line with opinions he shared in his Director’s Report in September 1946.
Emerson highlighted that stateless people had no government to protect them, no foreign office
to petition should they need help, and that the main aim of refugee policy over the past quarter of
a century had been to find some sort of substitute.442 He argued that the success in this field by
the League of Nations had been among its most outstanding humanitarian achievements, and that
the agreements the League had created to guarantee civil protections, travel documents, and
systems of aid to stateless people had become a model for the world. 443 Not only had the IGCR
recognized the refugee measures created by the League, but it had used them as a model in an
October 2, 1945 convention which agreed to create travel documents for displaced persons,
modeled on the League’s Nansen Passport. 444 It is not hard to imagine that Emerson’s
determination to protect the system of rights and protections that had been built both over the
war and in the years leading up to it stemmed not just from his genuine care for refugees, but
also his position as one of the last officials of the dying League.
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By the middle of 1946, Emerson had gotten his wish, and he participated in several
meetings with the United Nation’s Economic and Social Council concerning the creation of a
new, holistic refugee organization called the International Refugee Organization, or IRO. This
relatively fast follow through on the British recommendation followed the decision of the Soviet
Union to leave the IGCR due to its belief that there was too much Anglo-American influence on
it for it to be trustworthy.445 The various presentations and reports that Emerson delivered from
April to July of 1946 concerning finances, funding, and principles in refugee assistance can be
viewed as the culmination of his philosophical thought surrounding the best ways the world
could move forward with the displaced persons crisis. Emerson’s statements fall into three broad
categories: the structure and job of the proposed new organization, how it should absorb the
various other existing agencies and committees, and the philosophy it should be guided by.
Emerson argued that the structure of the IRO, as well as its responsibilities, should be a
combination of UNRRA and the IGCR. Its administration would consist of a plenary body
representing many different nations, with an executive body more involved with the day-to-day
administration, similar to the IGCR.446 Also like the IGCR, Emerson believed the IRO should
have representatives working directly with the governments of countries where refugee camps
were present, though this program had not reached its full potential under the IGCR. 447 The IRO
should be focused on the protection of refugees’ interests, emigration and settlement,
transporting refugees to their new homes, and providing them with material support, mixing the
planning and action mandates which had previously been divided amongst the IGCR and
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UNRRA.448 Finally, Emerson stressed the importance of voluntary organizations in helping
refugees, but warned that the IRO should steer well clear of these groups’ political beliefs,
perhaps highlighting the growing sense of Zionism in some Jewish organizations, or even
difficulties faced by UNRRA in its work.449 Emerson had practiced this same cautiousness
toward politically and religiously charged refugee groups at the IGCR as well. 450
Emerson also helped gage the possible costs of the first year of the IRO’s existence, as he
gave a thorough breakdown of the monetary experience of his Committee to shed light on what
could be expected.451 He provided descriptions of the actions taken by the League’s High
Commission, involving numbers of Nansen refugees in various nations, as well as the cost of
their upkeep.452 Indeed, Emerson provided an entire study to describe how the offices and
representatives of the IGCR and Nansen Office could be simply slotted into the IRO.

453

This

inclusion of the efforts of the League coincided with Emerson’s request that the IRO consider
making an office in its administration to deal specifically with Nansen refugees, as he had been
told by these very refugees that they were concerned about their protection with the advent of a
new refugee structure.454 Of course, this also mirrored his desires, expressed the year before, that
continuity be retained in the protections agreed upon for refugees.
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Emerson’s advice on the guiding principles and methods of the IRO are perhaps the most
interesting parts of his appearances before the Economic and Social Council. The four methods
of solving the refugee crisis, which he had first mentioned in his Foreign Affairs article and then
officially as a group of three in his 1945 High Commissioner report, returned, consisting of
repatriation, absorption, infiltration, and mass settlement. 455 Emerson stressed that the final
option of mass settlement was the most difficult, and that all options be explored before it be
considered, but that it had become a necessary strategy to be used. 456
His final recommendations for the IRO reflected Emerson’s long experience leading
refugee organizations, as he detailed what the IRO needed in order to make any sort of impact. It
needed to have a clear and defined mandate, so that the world, and the people involved, knew
what its purpose was.457 It had to have the highest authority bestowed upon it by the United
Nations, and one can guess that Emerson recommended this so that there existed a final authority
concerning refugees, unlike what he had experience during his time in the refugee system. 458 As
one could expect, he also recommended that it have an adequate system of finance, though the
amount of accounting detail that was requested of him by the Economic and Social Council leads
one to believe this was an obvious concern. Finally, he stressed that the IRO be assured to have
the sympathy and good will of all nations involved in its efforts of resettlement. 459 This may
have reflected Emerson’s belief that he had not always been given the help he needed by the
Allied governments where resettlement was concerned. 460
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On December 31, 1946, Emerson stepped down as the League of Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, ending the career of a man who had been dedicated to defending
those left defenseless during one of the worst wars in human history and ending the decades long
legacy of refugee assistance and protection held by the League of Nations. The legacy had been
passed on, and on July 1, 1947, the International Refugee Organization came fully into being, its
charter reflecting many of the recommendations made by Emerson. 461
The IRO’s mandate and goals in alleviating the displaced persons and refugee crisis
reflected Emerson’s own four points. Its charter explained that the IRO would work for the
repatriation of refugees, in addition to their absorption, infiltration, or larger-scale resettlement
into countries of final settlement.462 It also reflected some of the powers that Emerson advised
the U.N. to grant it, like aiding in the transport of refugees and taking over the guaranteeing of
their legal protection.463 As Emerson had requested, the IRO also took over responsibility of
refugees from before the war.464
The IGCR itself also served as a foundation for the makeup of the IRO’s charter. The
overall governance of the IRO matched that of the IGCR, with an Executive Committee to
oversee the daily operation of the organization and a General Council to make larger decisions,
led by a chairman and Director-General. 465 The ability of the IRO to handle public funds, a
development to international refugee assistance that had occurred under the IGCR, was written
into its charter, and, perhaps learning from the pitfalls of the IGCR, IRO representatives and
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delegates were to act as agents of the U.N. and IRO, not their home governments. 466 It can be
tempting to say that the similarity of the recommendations that Emerson made and the makeup
of the IRO’s charter are coincidental, as many seem to follow in line with common sense.
However, the fact that the U.N. took time to specifically interview Emerson on his opinions and
experience make the explanation of coincidence unsatisfactory, and the reality that it took nearly
25 years for developments that had been needed since the 1920s put common sense alone very
much in doubt.
There are several things that should be noted from the study of the final years of the
IGCR and High Commission for Refugees, as well as how they operated in the months following
the conclusion of World War II. First, groups like UNRRA and the IGCR, which had been
created to assist refugees both before and during the war, continued their operation in the postwar world. However, the scale of the refugee crisis that was left at the end of the war confounded
the Allied forces, though it had been anticipated by those like Emerson, and it showed the
weaknesses in their system. These weaknesses included the mandates of organizations that, while
initially designed to complement one another, made it difficult to offer very effective aid. Aid
was given, however, both at a scale and speed never before seen. Millions were repatriated in the
span of mere months, and the military and UNRRA, despite their limitations, were able to
prevent the refugee crisis from devolving into a disaster.
These weaknesses were apparent in the face of the reality that not all the displaced
persons could be repatriated, and further weaknesses were pointed out and debated by Harrison
and Eisenhower. It was eventually agreed that a better, more centralized system was needed to
help displaced persons and, so long as the protections and rights developed by the League over

466

Ibid., 4, 8.

119
several decades were assured, specialists like Emerson were willing to provide their expertise.
This led to the creation of the IRO which, while not ending the refugee crisis in a manner any
would call speedy, was an impressive endpoint of centrality and agreement for a system that had
seemed so fractured and ineffective a mere year beforehand and seemed to have come to grips
with the possibility of mass settlement.
Despite the work that had gone into preparing it, from conventions to closed door
conversations and telegrams, the refugee system that existed when the war ended was simply
unable to cope with the task before it. The fractured nature of the system, with the League’s High
Commissioner, the IGCR, and even UNRRA all operating in the same realm, but with a twisted
panoply of mandates and jurisdictions, made for a disparate and bloated system with little in the
way of a chain of command, outside of not getting in the military’s way. The refugee
organizations, whether through choice or necessity, differed to military leaders and supply
chains, awaiting the day when military control of the refugee problem would transfer to civilian
intergovernmental groups. How and when that transition would occur was unclear, but failings of
the military in long-term care pointed out by those like Earl Harrison in the summer of 1945,
despite its successes in quick repatriation of large groups of displaced persons, led many to
conclude that it had to happen soon.
Eventually, the military would step aside, and the future of civilian refugee organizations
for the post-war world began to be constructed. It was not a future that the League’s High
Commissioner or the IGCR would see. Due to their own structural problems, the criticism both
had gained from their handling of refugees over the course of the war, and the pure desire for a
new world order, they would not survive the ascension of the United Nations’ new refugee body,
the International Refugee Organization. This did not mean, however, that the years of experience
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with refugees that the High Commissioner represented, nor the post-war planning of the IGCR
went to waste and was simply passed over. Sir Herbert Emerson, as both the Director of the
IGCR and the High Commissioner for Refugees, detailed to the U.N. the design of the IRO,
including methods it could use in order to address the issue of displaced persons. By and large,
his recommendations were put to use, and the lessons and expertise from the IGCR and High
Commission helped form a bedrock for the U.N. refugee system that still exists to this day.
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Conclusion
Emma Haddad notes that, oftentimes, the global community assumed that refugee
problems were temporary things and, once properly addressed, they would fade into memory. 467
This was perhaps the thought process of the League of Nations when it involved itself in the
Russian refugee crisis following the end of World War I. It created a High Commission under
the dynamic Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, and agreements concerning the legal status of refugees were
made and signed, with passports and travel documents for stateless refugees following a few
years later. Outside of the physical relief of refugees, which could be handled mostly by
voluntary organizations, it seemed like there was little else the League needed to do, so much so
that the successor to Nansen’s Commission, the Nansen Office, was scheduled to liquidate nine
years after its creation, in 1939.
History seemed determined to prove the League wrong. The number of refugees that fell
under the League’s mandate had expanded to include numerous groups of refugees, but the
growth of Jewish emigration from Germany in 1933 proved too much for the League. By 1938,
both the League and the United States had come to the understanding that there needed to be a
reformation to the refugee system, which resulted in the League’s new High Commissioner for
Refugees, a mantle taken up by Sir Herbert Emerson, and the Intergovernmental Committee for
Refugees, the creation of the Evian Conference.
The bodies were supposed to be complimentary, with the IGCR filling in the gaps left by
the League’s system, to ensure the orderly emigration of those fleeing Nazi persecution, as well
as coordinating voluntary relief. Early on, it seemed as if headway was being made, as the IGCR
under George Rublee was able to negotiate the Schacht plan with Germany, showing that a way
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to streamline the messy process of emigration was possible. Once the more administratively
minded Emerson took the mantle of Director of the IGCR in 1939, the Schacht plan continued to
be investigated, and the possibility of the resettlement of countless refugees, like some 50,000
being sent to the Dominican Republic, was explored. While the process was difficult, and
governments at times seemed loath to help despite their stated willingness to do so, it seemed as
if the restructured refugee system would be able to survive the actions of the Nazis during the
1930s.
The outbreak of war cut short any belief in a quick solution, and the efforts of both the
High Commission and the IGCR slowed as transport lanes dried up and the seas became unsafe.
Some global leaders, like President Franklin D. Roosevelt, urged the IGCR to become involved
in long term planning for refugee settlement. In the meantime, Emerson accrued more
connections to refugee care, as he became heavily involved with the domestic refugee systems in
Britain, though from his connections he was able to trace the development of the situation on the
continent. It was not promising, and, with the fall of the Low Countries, he reported one of first
movements of a group President Roosevelt had foretold at the IGCR’s October 1939 meeting:
war refugees. Such was his involvement in the refugee crisis as World War II raged around him
that Emerson was approached by the Allied powers to discuss post-war refugee concerns.
There was an understanding that there were dangers for the Jews and other refugees left
on the continent, indeed, Emerson himself referred to reports he received concerning Nazi
conduct. There will, perhaps, always be the question of whether or not the international
community had a full understanding of the terrors that awaited those they could not, or would
not, save. However, it is unlikely that, even if the full number of leaders of the international
refugee system, from Emerson to McDonald, knew what was to come, they could do anything to
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change the outcome by the early 1940s. The full swing of total war had begun, and many of the
belligerent powers were too fearful for their own survival to place funds towards anything other
than stopping the onslaught of the Nazi forces. That is not to excuse the, at times, callous actions
and inactions of the Western powers, but to merely place context behind their choices. Many of
the countries involved in the IGCR and the League could truly not absorb the number of refugees
before them without hurting their own economies and labor forces. Further, by the end of the
summer of 1940 it was virtually impossible to remove refugees out of Europe in large numbers
due to the war. Regardless, by 1942, it was understood that restructuring was needed in the realm
of refugee systems, and changes in the war effort would make it so such a task was possible.
This restructuring took place from 1943 to 1944. The mandate of the IGCR was
expanded in the stated hopes that it would be more able to assist refugees both during and after
the war. This was also a period during which other bodies, like UNRRA and the War Refugee
Board, were created to deal with emergent refugee problems, as well as assist during the
immediate aftermath of the war, in the case of UNRRA. The IGCR did little of any real
substance during this period, with the notable exception of its involvement in the credit scheme
of the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee, though Emerson dedicated himself to
considering and anticipating post-war refugee concerns. This period also saw the further growth
of relations between the High Commission and the IGCR as Dr. Gustav Kullman, the Deputy
High Commissioner for Refugees, was named the Assistant Director of the IGCR.
When peace finally arrived in 1945, two things were made abundantly clear: Emerson,
and many others, had been right in their predictions that a number of refugees would refuse to
repatriate, and that the refugee system from the war years was not up to the task of addressing
the question of those that came to be called displaced persons. UNRRA, working in concert with
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Allied military forces, repatriated millions of refugees in a short period of time, but it could do
little more, as it was a temporary organization that only was able to relieve and repatriate, not
resettle. This task was supposed to fall to the IGCR, but its structural deficiencies, lack of funds,
and lack of manpower meant it could do little more than consider the question of refugees.
Consider it did, as Emerson developed his four points of handling displaced persons:
repatriation, absorption, infiltration, and resettlement.
Consideration, however, was not good enough to solve the problem. The deficient care
refugees and displaced persons received from the Allied forces, exaggerated or not, prompted the
Allied powers to consider another restructuring of the refugee system. This resulted in the
development of the U.N.’s International Refugee Organization, a body created to absorb the
responsibilities and mandates of the IGCR, UNRRA, and the League of Nations. The IRO was
not something brand new, as Emerson was intimately involved in the considerations of what the
body would look like and how it would operate. When the IRO finally began operation in 1947,
the 25-year long legacy of the League of Nations concerning refugees remained intact, though
the torch had been passed to a new body.
Historian Hugh Trevor-Roper once said that “the comfortable after-wisdom of the
historian is a luxury: he has no responsibility: he can afford to be wrong. Therefore he can only
state the facts and, like the tragedian, present rather than solve moral dilemmas.” 468 Though this
research focuses on Sir Herbert Emerson as a main character, if a historical study can have such
a thing, and has General Eisenhower and others as supporting characters, it is not about them.
Nor is it a study of the trials and travails of the refugees they tried to help, though, more studies
of the displaced persons are sorely needed. Nor is it an attempt to blame leaders and nations for
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things that could have, or should have, been done better for, as Feingold notes, historians must
go beyond just delivering sermons on man’s inhumanity to man. 469
Rather, it is a study of the systems of refugee care that were created by the League,
nurtured through the war by Emerson, the IGCR, and UNRRA, made practical in an occupied
land by Eisenhower, and made modern and centralized by the United Nations. It is an
examination of influences, some from something so universally panned as a failure like the
League, and others from the hearts and minds of men and women of both realist and idealist
stripes. But, more importantly, it is a history that makes things that have not been widely studied
known and seeks to pass no moral judgment in the process. It seeks to provide insight on the
systems, influences, and treatment of refugees which existed after World War II, and to provide a
reasoning for the actions taken by those involved.
In the introduction to his work, Feingold argues that “the accusation that the Roosevelt
administration did not do enough has no meaning until we determine how much might have been
done.”470 Determining what was done has yet to truly been investigated beyond the work of a
few historians and is of equal importance. The creation of the IGCR was instigated by the
Roosevelt administration, and as such it is usually relegated to the list of failures of Roosevelt in
the realm of refugee rescue and care. This passage of judgment is reductive and avoids the key
end goal of any historical study: understanding. The IGCR was a body that was replete with the
influence of the League of Nations’ past experience with refugees, and it serves as a “missing
link” between the systems that existed before the war and those that existed after it. Similarly,
the influence of those who were intimately involved with the IGCR, namely Herbert Emerson, is
a key factor of the development of refugee systems, as his experience with the League and the
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expertise he gained leading the IGCR was tapped for the IRO system. Wyman and Feingold
allow the IGCR to take a backseat in their examination of the refugee crisis of World War II,
while Sjöberg spends so much time contextualizing it that the actual actions and experience of
the body can be lost. All three give short thrift to Emerson, and the sheer scope of Proudfoot’s
work makes it difficult to follow at times. This thesis shows the influence and impact of the
IGCR, the League of Nations, and Herbert Emerson in the international refugee systems of the
twentieth century, even if this influence was often delayed in its implementation.
To be sure, the modern world has not recently come out of a cataclysmic war, nor is there
a current attempt to create a new world order in the style of Yalta. Thus, it seems that many of
the issues that this research touches on remain in the past, where they can be studied and picked
apart by historians in a sterile environment. However, problems exist now as they did then, even
the problem of refugees and how they should be cared for by the world. History can provide new
avenues of learning to see if the structures of the past, with their multitudes of successes and
failures, may point a way forward for those who live now. As Malcolm Proudfoot ended his
1957 study of the efforts of UNRRA and the IGCR, “it may be true that history never repeats
itself, but it is equally true that to refuse to learn anything from it can be, at best, a tremendous
waste of time and, at worst, a tragic error.”471
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